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PREFACE
Having grown in a home where both parents are bilinguals lias sparked in me a 
spontaneous interest in language. Having studied a second language in an 
educational setting has raised in me a high awareness of language. In a sense, this 
survey represents the realization of gradual, evolving exposure to second 
language: from home to school to research. Theories and claims about second 
language acquisition (SLA) have rarely been contrasted, despite the crucial role 
that they play in the development of a second language, either in a natural or 
educational environment. It is only recently that classifications of SLA theories 
have appeared in the literature, showing an attempt by researchers to find 
similarities and differences among existing theories. This study reviews the 
process of second language acquisition in SLA theories and discusses the notion 
of consciousness in the theories. A few comments are in order here.
First, only theories which deal with the cognitive aspect of learning are 
included. Second, the chapters which discuss these theories can be read in any 
sequence the reader may wish for they are modular in nature. And as they are 
self-contained, I decided to encapsulate the bibliographical references within each 
chapter. Third, the order in which the theories are presented resembles the order 
in which they were written. This somehow reflects the growth of the researcher in 
terms of writing ability, development of critical view, and power to analyse the 
theories. Fourth, it was felt that the abundance of technical terms might interfere 
with comprehension. Thus, for purposes of enhanced readability, a glossary for 
technical terms is provided at the end of tins study.
I am very grateful to my advisor, Hilário Bolin, for providing an enriching 
environment of academic excellence that was crucial to this work.. I am also 
thankful to Prof. Michel Paradis, who kindly listened to my questions and 
answered them. Finally, I would like to make mine the words of a successful 
neurosurgeon from New York University Medical Center, Dr. Fred Epstein: 'We 
need the courage to pursue new concepts and ideas, otherwise the fear of being 
wrong keeps us from ever being right’.
THE (UNCONSCIOUSNESS OF SECOND LANGUAGE ACQUISITION
PAULA FATUR SANTOS
UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE SANTA CATARINA
1994
Supervising Professor: Dr Hilário Inácio Bohn 
ABSTRACT
This theoretical study aims at presenting what some important psycholinguistic 
theories of SLA say about the process of SLA in general, and about the conscious 
and unconscious aspects of this process in particular. It also compares the 
psycholinguistic view found in the SLA field with a cognitive psychological view, 
Ausubel's Assimilation theory. Similarly, it compares the psycholinguistic view 
with a neurolinguistic view, Paradis’. Such multi-disciplinary comparisons were 
provided because it is assumed that the SLA process is highly complex, involving 
multiple aspects and having to draw from multiple areas in order to be fully 
explained. The study results in a classification of psycholinguistic theories of 
SLA according to their source-influence areas. Thus, theories were classified 
into Linguistics-based and Psychologically-based theories. The classification 
brings to light the two trends that permeate recent psycholinguistic research in 
SLA one that argues for a conscious type of learning, the psychological trend; 
and one that argues for unconscious acquisition, which has its roots in Chomsky, 
the linguistic trend.
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RESUMO
Este estudo teórico analisa o processo de aquisição de segunda língua, em geral, e 
os aspectos conscientes e inconscientes deste processo, em particular, nas mais 
importantes teorias psicolingüísticas de aquisição de segunda língua Além disso, 
este mesmo processo é analisado em uma teoria psicológico-cogniiiva, a teoria da 
Assimilação de Ausubel, e em uma teoria neurolingüística, a de Par adis. A busca 
de teorias multidisciplinares deve-se ao fato de que o processo de aquisição de 
segunda língua è per se altamente complexo, envolvendo múltiplos aspectos e, 
conseqüentemente, múltiplas disciplinas. A análise do processo nas teorias 
culmina numa classificação das mesmas. A percepção das áreas subjacentes às 
teorias foi o critério encontrado para classificá-las. Assim, elas foram 
classificadas em teorias que emanam da Psicologia, tendência esta que privilegia
o aprendizado consciente, baseada na Psicologia Cognitiva, e que emanam da 
Lingüística, tendência que privíligia a aquisição inconsciente e que tem suas raízes 
em Chomsky.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
With the explosion of Cogni&vism, marked by Piaget in Psychology and by 
Chomsky in Linguistics, the behavioral sciences entered a new era. Studies 
shifted from behavior as the object of studies to behavior as the means to 
understand the workings of the mind. Thus, the emphasis was placed on the 
mind, its processes, what underlying reasons cause a certain behavior.
Research in Second Language Acquisition (SLA) followed the above 
tendency, moving from research on teaching to research on the learning process. 
That move also marked the emergence of SLA as an independent discipline, 
when numerous issues related to the acquisition of a second language (SL) 
started to be studied. As a consequence, the field started to draw from the 
most diverse areas of knowledge -- Psychology, Linguistics, Sociology, 
Psycholinguistics, Sociolinguistics, Neurolinguistics (cf. Larsen-Freeman & 
Long 1991:5) -  and is expected to collaborate with these areas as well.
This muKidisciplinarity was especially beneficial to the study of the process 
of second language acquisition. This process involves a diversity of variables, 
making it a very complex and controversial issue. The number of SLA theories 
that have been proposed in the literature is evidence of this. Larsen-Freeman & 
Long (ibid:227) suggest that there are over 40 theories of SLA Each of these 
theories tries to explain acquisition from a specific viewpoint, be it the social, 
the affective, the cognitive, or some other. And even within the scope of a 
specific viewpoint, say, cognitive theories, there is controversy. For one tiling, 
theories that follow a Chomskyan tradition often claim that the process is 
largely unconscious, a matter of triggering what is innately programmed. On the 
other hand, Hie cognitive-psychological tradition attributes much
2consciousness to Hie process, all of which comes from experience. In any case, 
perhaps precisely because of its complexity and controversial nature, the SLA. 
process is so amazingly interesting to researchers.
The complexity of the acquisition process can be better visualized when we 
consider the factors involved in it, such as the neurological, psychological, and 
social factors . All factors are sufficiently important in SLA to engage our 
most serious considerations, as they influence the learning process 
concomitantly and interact in various ways. Nevertheless, either set can be 
examined while the others are held constant. This applies to this present study 
of cognitive processes — it looks at just a fraction of the whole learning process, 
but a fraction which seems to be more immediate, less tangential, more crucial 
in its impact on SLA than are affective and social factors. Figure 1 spells out 
the main factors involved in the SLA process:
Fig.l Factors involved in the learning process, highlighting the ones covered 
m this dissertation.
3This theoretical study aims at presenting what some important 
psycholinguists theories of SLA. say about the process of SLA in general, and 
about the conscious and unconscious aspects of this process in particular. It 
also compares the views found in the SLA theories with a cognitive 
psychological view, namely, Ausubel’s Assimilation theory. The comparison is 
due to a belief that a second language acquisition theory should draw from 
theories of learning and not only from theories of language since in many 
aspects cognitive development and language development overlap. Similarly, 
this study compares the psycholinguistic view with Paradis' neurolinguistic 
view, in order to provide a realistic neurolegically feasible picture of the 
acquisition process. The study results in a classification of psycholinguistic 
theories of SLA according to the areas which constitute their source of 
influence, the criterion which was found to be the most relevant for the 
clarification of the psycholinguistic picture of SLA.
Cook (1993) describes the three aspects that a (psycholinguistic) theory or 
model of SLA should cover.
1. the description of the competence system, or mental grammar, in the 
Chomskyan sense, or knowledge about the language, as it has been called more 
recently;
2. the description of processes used to build (acquire) the competence system, 
or developmental processing, as called by Sharwood Smith (1991); and
3 the description of procedures to access the competence system, or the 
ability to use language, or, following Sharwood Smith's terminology, on-line 
knowledge processing.
In the following lines, I use Cook's description to determine the scope of tins 
dissertation.
4Concerning aspect number 1, when I say that a theory includes a description 
of the competence system in whatever form it may be, I do not mean only a 
description of the linguistic system as such, of its phonology, mofphosyntax, 
and semantic constraints on the lexicon (the generative), or even a description 
of the network of information which constitutes language competence (the 
connectionist), rather, I also mean a description of the nature of the system, 
what Hie competence system consists of. Note that, when describing the nature 
of the system, I am not leaving aside the territory of metaphors and abstractions 
which characterize the descriptions of the competence system as such, like the 
generative and connectionist descriptions, but I am somehow going beyond the 
theoretical territory and going towards a realistic picture of how that competence 
system is realized in the mind, conceived as a real entity, made feasible. It must 
be clear that this realization (in the sense used above) is not free of metaphors 
and abstractions, for not only psychology but also neurology has to rely on 
metaphorical models and abstractions in order to explain how the mind works.
In some theories, aspect number 1 is inevitably linked to number 2, that is, 
the description of the acquisition processes and that of the representation of the 
linguistic system are inseparable (for instance, Sharwood Smith 1991). In 
others, aspect number 1 is implicit, that is, if the processes described in the 
acquisition of the linguistic system are said to be similar to Chomsky's 
description of LI processes, we expect that this linguistic system refers to the 
generative /Universal Grammar model. This is the case in Krashen’s and 
Prabhu's theories. Thus, aspect number 1 needs to be considered in order to 
show whether a theory stems from linguistics or psychology.
Aspect number 3, language processing, deals mainly with language use, a 
processing phenomenon that comprises the linguistic tasks of production and 
reception. The use of unconscious processes in these tasks is undeniable and
5has been more aid more described by psycholinguists (Jackendoff 1987; 
Sharwood Smith 1991). Cognitive psychologists Meichenbaum and Gilmore 
(1984:276) compare such processes to physiological processes:
In the same way that we engage in a variety of physiological processes 
(breathing, stomach contractions, and so foith) without awareness, a similar 
analogy can be drawn to how we process information.
Misunderstandings involving aspect number 3 happen sporadically in 
theories that claim to be learning theories, when in fact they address language 
processing. This seems to be the case with McLaughlin (1987) in the first 
version of his theory, where he explained basically access to knowledge, but 
claimed to be presenting a cognitive theory of SLA. Because of criticisms of this 
kind (Cook 1993:267), his more recent version (1990) contains the notion of 
restructuring, a notion devised to explain knowledge acquisition. But in general, 
theories of language processing are well defined and self-contained so that at 
first it would seem possible to leave them out of a study that does not specifically 
address language processing, if it were not for one reason. The acquisition of 
language competence is only shown in performance. Thus, as is the case ip. 
this study, sometimes it is impossible to talk of language acquisition without 
talking of performance mechanisms.
While aspect number 1 deals with the description of the competence system, 
and aspect number 3 deals with procedures to access this system, in this 
dissertation I am concerned with aspect number 2, acquisition of the competence 
system.
Some clarifications about terminology seem in order. Hie first concerns the 
theories dealt with in this dissertation. I chose to call theories of SLA that dead 
with the cognitive aspect of the learning process psycholinguistic theories of 
SLA My choice is principled, and it is explained in chapter 8, where I discuss
6the recent polemics that involve the word psycholinguistics. The second 
concerns the use of the expression SLA. The range of SLA as an independent 
discipline has broadened significantly recently, and presently the term. SLA 
encompasses the study of both a second and foreign language environments, 
irrespective of the differences between them. The same is true for the key terms 
acquisition and learning, the third terminological problem to be clarified. 
Acquisition has become a superordinate term for both of them, although 
originally acquisition refers to natural settings and learning to classroom 
settings. In this study, Hie terms are used interchangeably, irrespective of the 
differences between them, except where it is indicated that a specific meaning is 
ascribed to them.
Theories are first explained as a whole — however briefly, the functioning of 
theories is explained — with special emphasis on the process of SLA. Then, the 
theoretical constructs of the theories are analyzed. These constructs provide 
tools for a discussion of the conscious and unconscious aspects of each 
theory, and they reveal the areas which constitute the source of influence of the 
different theories. From the areas, a natural classification emerges.
An outline of the dissertation follows:
Chapter 2, Drawing from Psychology, reviews some important psychological 
issues that are useful to the present debase of conscious versus unconscious 
processes in SLA, drawing from the area that is generally in charge of 
explaining them: psychology. Ausubel’s Assimilation Theory is also presented in 
this chapter in order to introduce the reader to a sound cognitive psychological 
theory of knowledge acquisition and acquaint the reader with his unique 
explanation of how knowledge is organized so as to form a cognitive structure.
7Chapter 3 presents Krashen's Monitor Model. It discusses the distinction 
between acquisition and learning processes. It also evaluates how the notions 
of conscious/unconscious serve as the constructs of this theoretical model.
Chapter 4 deals with Prabhu's Task-oriented Approach. Actually, this is a 
pedagogical proposal rather than a SLA theory or model, but it was included in 
this study for the interesting tenets that underlie the approach and lead to the 
pedagogical procedures proposed, the tasks. In this chapter, thus, the tenets of his 
approach are discussed, as well as the cognitive value of the task for the 
acquisition process.
Chapter 5 introduces an experimental model — Pienemann’s Multidimensional 
Model. Initially, I consider his two dimensions of the learning process: the 
developmental and the variational. Then, I establish the theoretical construct of 
the model, namely, sentence processing.
Seliger’s view of the language acquisition process is presented in chapter 6. 
First, I present the two kinds of knowledge, linguistic and metalinguistic, that 
he claims are involved in SLA Second, I discuss his particular view of verbal 
reports and their validity for explaining certain complex issues.
Chapter 7 examines Sharwood Smith’s view. First, the Pedagogical Grammar 
Hypothesis which belongs to the early phase of his work is analyzed. The 
analysis thereon will concentrate on the more recent phase, which is influenced 
byFodor’s modularity thesis.
In chapter 8, McLaughlin's Information-Processing Model, the cognitive 
exemplar of the learning of a second language, is examined. First, I trace 
Cognitive Psychology as its source of influence. Second, I discuss his 
emphasis of language use over acquisition. Third, I discuss later incorporations 
to the model, such as the notion of restructuring, which were inserted in order to 
account for linguistic idiosyncrasies.
8Chapter 9 has a speculative nature. It reaches the point of classifying the 
theories analyzed in terms of their source-infiuence areas in order to clear up 
the picture of psycholinguistic research in SLA. In this way, it is somehow 
conclusive as far as the theories studied are concerned.
Chapter 10, Drawing from Neurolinguistics, incorporates the substantial 
contemporary contributions of a neuroscience into the discussion of the SLA 
process. It presents a realistic picture of how linguistic information is organized 
in Hie brain and the mechanisms used to acquire and access it.
In the concluding chapter, I pull together the insights gained from the study 
of SLA theories and the insights provided by neurolinguistics, thus achieving a 
state of the art on the issue of psycholinguistic processes used in SLA 
Pedagogical implications of the proposed view are also considered.
Although I have attempted to describe the processes found in the various 
theories/models extensively and profoundly, this was not always possible due to 
the obscurity and subjectivity that permeate the theories. The subjectivity lies, 
among other things, in the lack of precision of terms, which are widely used 
but whose real meaning is never made clear to the reader. Thus, we are obliged 
to infer without being sure how much we can infer from what is said. The 
obscurity seems to be a reflex of the present state of research about the *black 
box' ~ it seems that authors are just feeling their way within the SLA field: 
hypothesizing, speculating, theorizing. While this happens, other fields (such as 
die Cognitive Sciences) start to take over research matters that previously 
belonged to SLA Or is it SLA that is moving towards these fields? In any case, a 
chance must be given for SLA research to show how much it has come to 
know about the ’black box’ in these twenty years of research as an independent 
discipline.
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CHAPTER 2
DRAWING FROM PSYCHOLOGY
The value of consciousness in human life is something which extends across philosophy to 
psychology and to linguistics.'
Vivian Cook (1993:68)
In this chapter, I discuss some important concepts to this dissertation 
borrowed from psychology. I first discuss the nature of unconscious processes 
and contents, as proposed by Reber in Experimental Psychology. I also take on 
Chomsky's view of the unconscious, although he is traditionally considered a 
linguist. Then, I present the concepts of unconscious processes and unconscious 
knowledge as they should be understood in this dissertation. Finally, I briefly 
explain Hie most typical exemplar of a cognitive psychological theory, namely,. 
Ausubel's Assimilation Theory.
The nature of unconscious processes and contents
According to experimental psychologist Reber (1989), devoted to the study 
of implicit learning and unconscious cognitive processes, consciousness is a 
mental state of late origin 'The proper stance is to assume that unconscious 
mental states are the foundations upon which emerging conscious operations are 
laid' (ibid:230). As to the nature of unconscious cognition, he assumes that we 
have a primitive unconscious that we share 'with all corticated species. And we 
have a sophisticated unconscious which has a basic difference from the former - 
- its processes, which all depend on a rich, abstract knowledge base which 
controls perception, affective choice and decision-making independently of 
consciousness. The primitive unconscious is active and fundamental for 
survival. Three points are important for the comprehension of the functioning of 
the primitive unconscious:
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1. Hie pickup of information takes place in the absence of awareness of what 
is being picked up (implicit learning).
2. Much of what is acquired can be explained/ articulated/verbalized 
consciously, but the amount that is stored is much greater than the amount that 
can be explained.
3. The function of the primitive unconscious processes (which are automatic) 
is’to pick up critical knowledge about categories and about co-variations of 
aspects of categories’ (ibid:231). Such knowledge is not related to meaning, 
affect, or interpretation ~ these belong to the sophisticated unconscious.
The sophisticated unconscious depends on previously acquired knowledge, 
whereas the primitive has the function of acquiring such knowledge. There are 
other differences between them. The sophisticated unconscious is generally 
available to consciousness, that is, there is awareness of the knowledge base 
itself. The scope of this awareness, however, is greater than the scope of the 
covert base. In other words, the possibility of information of the knowledge base 
becoming conscious is greater than of it remaining unconscious. These bases 
work at a symbolic level. They all involve semantic and affective properties. 
It is similar to what is generally known as cognitive structure.
Chomsky's view of the unconscious
Chomsky (1980 cited in Bowers & Meichenbaum 1984.156) considers 
unconscious processes those which are inaccessible in principle, that is, it is 
possible to ’acquire knowledge of their presence and activity by inference, but 
not by means of direct, immediate introspective awareness’. Unconscious 
knowledge (or tacit, innate) is in the mind, it is employed in the service of 
ongoing cognitive processing, but is not accessible to introspection. It is active, 
but not reachable. Besides, unconscious linguistic knowledge is basically the 
same for every speaker-hearer (universal).
12
If we compare Rebel’s definition and Chomsky's, we will see that in both 
senses of the word, the psychological and the linguistic, the unconscious is 
active rather than dormant; and in both cases, unconscious mental processes 
operate on different principles than conscious ones. But both definitions 
conform to the general principle in psychology (Bowers & Meichenbaum 
1984:156) that there is an unconscious level of mental activity which 
influences behavior in one way or another .
Unconscious processes and knowledge
In order to provide the reader with a definition of the unconscious congruent 
with the notion used in tins study, I will take the meaning that is most often 
implied in learning theories as well as in language theories. When I speak of the 
unconscious in such theories, I am referring either to the unconscious process 
of learning or to the product of this process, unconscious knowledge. Mien 
the process is under consideration, then this is implicit learning, a type of 
learning of complex skills, such as a language, held outside awareness. When 
we refer to the product of tins process, it is tacit knowledge that we are referring 
to, knowledge that is internalized but not verbalizable. It is possible to relate 
such notions with those posed by Reber as to the nature of unconscious 
processes: implicit learning involves the use of the primitive unconscious. 
The result of implicit learning is tacit knowledge, whose probability of being 
unavailable to verbalization is high.
Actually there is no clear border line as to which cognitive processes used in 
acquisition are unconscious and which are conscious. Claims are often the 
result of speculation of researchers. What we can say is that some processes 
have a higher probability of being used unconsciously, although it is safe to say 
that tins is polemical. Here I list some of them, frequently cited in psychological 
and linguistic literature (Ausubel 1978; Snow [in press], McLaughlin 1978:321-
13
3): induction, deduction, inferencing, hypothesis-fonnulation and testing, 
transfer, acquisition heuristics (as posed by McLaughlin:ibid) such as 
overgeneralization, avoidance, imitation, simplification, Slobin's operating 
principles (see glossary). Problem-solving can be considered an unconscious 
process when it is a means to achieve a mag or goal. When it is a goal per se, it is 
a conscious strategy. But in that case, the step-by-step procedures that lead to the 
solution of the problem are unconscious, since the focus of attention on the goal 
to be achieved turns the attention away from the procedures.
In this study, it is presupposed that both conscious and unconscious 
processes are involved in SLA, but it is asked what role each of them plays in the 
SLA process and how they are characterized in SLA theories.
Having discussed some concepts relevant to the rest of this dissertation, I will 
now describe a cognitive psychological view of the acquisition of knowledge. 
The outstanding name here is Ausubel, who has the most complete, unparalleled 
theory, about the acquisition of knowledge, the Assimilation Theory.
AusufoeFs Assimilation Theoiy
David Ausubel has had a significant impact on our present understanding of 
the process of learning, particularly learning in an educational setting. His book 
Educational Psychology - A Cognitive View is a classic in the field of 
educational psychology. The Assimilation Theory, as labeled by Ausubel and 
his associates, contends that the learner's present knowledge plays a critical role 
in the process of future learning. His theory of learning has a more cognitive 
focus than an affective-social one, and so the contribution of his thought may be 
fully appreciated in the context of discussion on cognitive variables in learning.
One of the model’s greatest strength qua theory is that all knowledge is 
hierarchically organized in the learner's mind and that this prior structured 
knowledge is the most important factor at the time of learning, determining the
14
learner's capacity for acquiring new concepts or information. Ausubel (1978:163) 
puts it this way:
If I had to reduce all of educational psychology to just one principle, I 
would say this: The most important single factor influencing learning is 
what the learner already knows. Ascertain this and teach him accordingly.
Prior knowledge in this case is characterized as the quantity and organization 
of the learner's present knowledge which is made up of information, concepts, 
ideas, facts and propositions. This body of knowledge constitutes the learner's 
cognitive structure. Ausubel maintains that the most inclusive ideas are set at 
the top of this structure, thus maintaining a hyponymical organization.
Based on his observations of the learning process, Ausubel assumes that 
learning takes place in the student's mind through a process of meaningfully 
relating new concepts to old concepts in cognitive structure. For the present, 
perhaps, it is necessary to distinguish the properties of cognitive structure that 
influence learning.
First, the learning of new information is a function of the existence of 
relevant anchoring ideas. These anchoring ideas occupy a more general, 
inclusive position in the structure of knowledge and serve as cognitive hooks or 
pegs on which new ideas can be hung.
A second major property in learning is the discriminability of new concepts 
from old anchoring ideas in cognitive structure. The assumption here is that 
existing knowledge is dominant and new knowledge is subservient whenever 
they are similar in nature. In such a case, old knowledge takes over the cognitive 
field and superimposes itself on similar new knowledge.
A last factor affecting learning is the stability and clarity of the established 
anchoring ideas. A stable and clear cognitive structure provides strong 
anchorage for new informational units, whereas unstable and ambiguous
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knowledge provide weak anchorage for new material wiiich will result ill poor 
learning.
In his discussion Ausubel distinguishes two independent dimensions of 
learning along which all learning can be located. The first dimension is the 
reception-discovery dimension. The essential feature of reception learning is 
Hiatt the content of the learning task is given to the student. Under this 
circumstance the learner is required to comprehend the material and to 
incorporate it into his cognitive structure. In discovery learning, on the other 
hand, the information to be learned is not given; the student must determine 
what inform ation is to be acquired before it can be established into the his/her 
cognitive structure. The importance of this first distinction becomes clear 
when we consider Ausubel’s claims that people as a whole acquire a massive 
body of knowledge primarily through reception learning.
The second contrasting dimension is the rote-meaningful continuum. The 
crucial factor in determining whether learning is rote or meaningful is the 
relevance or significance with which the new material is handled. Rote learning 
is a process in which new material is related to prior knowledge through 
arbitrary associations. That is, it involves the collection of new ideas bearing 
little or no relationship with the existing cognitive structure.
Meaningful learning is a process in which new material is related to prior 
knowledge through logical associations. Thai is, it involves meaningful 
interaction of new material with the existing cognitive structure. The very fact 
that material is associable with stable cognitive hooks accounts for its anchorage 
or meaningfulness.
The significance of the rote—meaningful learning continuum is perhaps best 
appreciated when we consider retention of learned material for long periods 
of time. Meaningfully learned material has far greater potential for retention, 
whereas rote learning is less productive and less retrievable. Try, for instance,
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to recall where, who with, what you were doing on Feb 18, 1988. It is unlikely 
that you will remember anything, unless this date is relevantly associable with a 
special event in your life.
In short, the key concept in Ausubel's Assimilation Theory is that learning 
must be meaningful. The learners must understand what is to be learned; relate 
it to their present knowledge in a rational, nonverbaiini manner, and integrate 
fiie material being learned into their own cognitive structure.
I consider the learning process proposed by Ausubel clearly conscious. The 
assimilation of new knowledge is more feasible if it is relevantly associable with 
prior knowledge. It is the learner’s task to perceive relevant associations 
between what s/he already knows and what is to be learned. The learner, then, is 
in a position to deliberate what is learned or not. This decision involves 
consciousness.
To what extent does Ausubel’s cognitive theory apply to SL learning? 
Learning a second language involves both conscious and unconscious aspects, 
that will be unraveled throughout this dissertation. The conscious aspects are 
very well explained by the Assimilation Theory. However, the learning of an 
SL has peculiar aspects that develop in their own idiosyncratic way. Such 
aspects are known to undergo another type of learning, basically 
unconscious. This type is mostly explained by what I call linguistics-influenced 
theories, that will be discussed in the following chapters. But irrespective of the 
type of learning, Ausubel offers a powerful and thorough explanation of how 
knowledge builds up the cognitive structure.
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CHAPTER 3
THE MONITOR MODEL
la this chapter I briefly describe how the Monitor Model explains the 
second language acquisition process. After that, 1 develop the concept of 
acquisition process, or the internal cognitive ability responsible for the 
building up of language competence, as proposed by Krashen. Another aspect 
of the first hypothesis of the model, the acquisition-learning hypothesis, is 
discussed, then,the non-interface hypothesis. The final sections are concerned 
with criticisms of Krashen's model, as far as the first hypothesis is concerned. 
One criticism I raise is of the inconsistent use of the term subconscious. The 
others are related to Krashen's empirical evidence, or the lack of it.
The model
Krashen proposes a theory for building competence in a second language 
based on two independent processes, acquisition and learning. Acquisition is a 
subconscious process, similar or identical to the one children use to acquire 
the first and second languages in natural environments. It is sometimes
referred to as an innate 'ability1 for the acquisition of languages. Learning is a
/
conscious process, involving internalization of the rules of the language and the 
ability to talk about them, normally brought about by instruction.
Besides this innate cognitive ability for the acquisition of languages, other 
conditions must be met for the acquisition process to take place, according to 
the Monitor Model: the adequate input (comprehensible input) must be 
provided to the learner, and the learner must be 'open' to this input by 
acquiring in an atmosphere in winch s/he is not anxious, thus keeping his/her 
'affective filter* low. These conditions constitute the other hypotheses that form 
Hie Monitor Model, but they will not be developed here because they are not
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relevant to tins study, since the focus here will be on the conscious/ 
unconscious issue.
The cognitive ability
According to Krashen et al. (1978:73), acquisition refers to the creative 
construction process. It is a product of the LAD — the Language Acquisition 
Device postulated by Chomsky, the difference being that the Chomskyan LAD 
did not depend on input to the same extent that Krashen's does: acquisition is a 
'subconscious process for developing ability in language via die language 
"mental organ". [Chomsky 1975] Requires comprehensible input' (Krashen 
1985:100). In this process, the learner already starts with basic assumptions or 
constraints on the language and develops along a pre-ordained sequence, 
known as the natural order. Krashen does not tell us much about this sequence, 
nor about Hie processes responsible for it.
One tiling that he does tell us about acquisition is that it involves hypothesis- 
testing, a process which takes place on a subconscious level of the mind 
(ibid:36). This process refers basically to the formulation of hypotheses, 
examining the input for confirmation or disconfirmation of the hypotheses 
(testing them), firming them up into rules, reorganizing the rules. Bley-Vroman 
(1986) and Snowr (in press) support the claim that the processes of hypothesis- 
testing and rale generation operate in the second language learner. Evidences 
listed by Snow (in press) are: (1) the occurrence of 'developmental errors' by 
second language speakers, i.e., errors which are explainable as 
overgeneralizations based on features of the target language rather than 
interference from features of the native language, for example, foots, hided, 
corned, (2) recapitulation of the same order of acquisition shown, by first 
language learners; (3) similar acquisition for speakers of different language
backgrounds; and (4) identifiable strategies of acquisition similar to those of 
young first language learners, such as imitation of chunks or ’modular patterns1 
Despite the fact that Krashen does not explicitly address Universal Grammar 
(UG) when explaining his model, we cannot separate the workings of the LAD 
from the Chomskyan notion of UG. Krashen's reliance on Chomsky’s work, 
and the presence of a natural order suggest some kind of access to UG in 
Krashen's model. If so, then the hypothesis-testing ability is constrained by 
UG, that is, it can only produce a grammar consistent with the principles and 
parameters of UG. In oilier words, there is a built-in grammar that develops 
subconsciously when triggered by the adequate type of input, thus giving rise to 
a certain order of acquisition. For that reason, ungrammatical hypotheses (in 
reference to UG) are not feasible.
Researchers do not agree whether UG is available to the adult second 
language learner. There are several positions taken by them Some argue against 
tiie premise that UG is available to SL learners (Schachter 1990); some argue in 
favor of it (White 1990); some argue that there is evidence that SL learners 
have access to UG through their first language (Felix & Weigl 1991). In general, 
linguists' positions are similar to Krashen's: although they do not explicitly state 
it, some kind of access to UG is implied in their work.
One criticism made to the Monitor Model is related exactly to this point: 
because of more developed cognitive abilities, an adult can infringe upon the 
constraints of UG (Gregg 1984). In principle, the LAD corresponds to an initial 
stage of language acquisition in the child. In the adult, the LAD would not have 
this characteristic. Concerning tins, Gregg (ibid SO) says:
Not only is an adult not in an initial state with respect to language, but he 
also is endowed with a much richer set of cognitive structures, which 
theoretically at least could enable him to violate the constraints of UG.
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As a matter of fact, the acquisition-learning hypothesis ignores some 
characteristics which are particular to adults, such as superior cognitive 
capacities, larger memory span, meta-awareness of language, and more 
developed pragmatic knowledge, and assumes they are equal to children in this 
respect, stating that adults still have access to the LAD and so are able to use 
the acquisition process. This point is contested mainly by those who take a 
psychological view of the learning process. They assume that language 
knowledge is processed in the brain like any other kind of knowledge, that it is 
a product of general intellectual capacity, not specialized knowledge, and that 
as such it is influenced by the characteristics mentioned above as proper to adults
The non-interface hypothesis
A fundamental claim related to the acquisition—learning dichotomy is that 
learned knowledge cannot be transformed into acquired knowledge. This is 
known as the 'non interface hypothesis' (Krashen 1985:38). If acquisition is a 
process independent from learning, it does not benefit from conscious learning. 
In order to argue for this point, Krashen relies basically on observation of 
learners' reports. He cites examples of learners who are able to use complex 
structures in the second language and despite this, cannot explain the rules they 
use. The opposite is also true for him, that is, it is possible to find people who 
know the rides but are not able to use them correctly while actively using the 
SL. Finally, he also claims that SL learners or speakers use a lot more rules than 
they are able to describe, and this is true for very good learners or even for 
linguists. Such phenomena are part of the experience of every second language 
teacher, being, in tins sense, extremely intuitive. Actually, tins is what Krashen 
must have meant when he built lus theory: 'to explain phenomena and 
provide a sense o f understanding' (ibid: 104).
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However, the statement learned competence does not become acquired 
competence* (ibid:42), also implies something that is not so empathetic to SL 
teachers, namely, that conscious knowledge cannot become subconscious. The 
process of internalization or routinization of structures, still common in SL 
classrooms, does not produce SL competence, according to Krashen On that 
aspect, he holds a very daring and provoking position, once so many teaching 
methods, approaches and techniques have relied so heavily upon these concepts 
for so long.
Aîi important consequence of the non-interface hypothesis is that learning 
serves only as a monitor, that is, an editor. Since it does not derive from the 
acquisition system, the monitor has a limited scope: it accounts only for those 
parts of the language for which the learner knows explicitly and consciously the 
rules. Besides, it is only available to the learner when s/he has time to monitor, 
and focuses on fomi, i.e., on the rules. Because the monitor works only as a 
source of editing or self-correction, it cannot start the production process 
(output). Only acquired knowledge serves for initiating utterances.
The conscious/subconscious issue
One of the most common criticisms made to the first hypothesis of the 
Monitor Model, the learning — acquisition hypothesis, is that Krashen has never 
defined the terms conscious and subconscious precisely, and it seems that this 
lack of precision in the definition has caused most of the problems in Krashen's 
proposal and consequently in the theory itself. In fact, these terms can 
encompass several definitions, depending on the context/area they refer to. In 
the case of Krashen’s model, if we consider the constructs that underlie the 
model, we will see that the concepts conscious and subconscious take us back to 
the Chomskyan notion of unconscious processes and knowledge, which are 
processes that are inaccessible in principle, that is, ’We can acquire knowledge
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of their presence and activity by inference, but not by means of direct, 
immediate introspective awareness’ (Chomsky 1980 cited in Bowers and 
Meichenbanm 1984:156). Such processes and knowledge are very clearly 
defined by Chomsky: it is ’knowledge which resides in the mental system, and 
is actively employed in the service of ongoing cognitive processing, but which is 
incapable of being brought into phenomenal awareness (physical 
consciousness) and placed under voluntary control. We know the contents of 
the mind only by inference, never through direct introspection' (ibid). On that 
basis, I object to Krashen's use of the word subconscious, which, according to 
traditional definition in psychology (Reber 1985:740), refers to information 
that is at the margins of awareness, but which can be made conscious, given 
the proper circumstances. This type of information is not the same as tacit
knowledge (see glossary), which is actually what Chomsky is talking about
t
(Chomsky 1975:164-6). Thus, it is wise to follow Reber as he adverts, 
subconscious 'should not, in any circumstance be used as a synonym for 
unconscious' (ibid).
Concerning the use of the terms unconscious/subconscious in tins dissertation, 
I followed the terminology used by each author in their models. Whenever my 
opinion was at matter, the term unconscious was preferred.
Empirical evidence
The most severe criticisms evoked by the Monitor Model are related to the 
lack of empirical data to support the leaming-acquisition distinction. 
McLaughlin (1978) states that the evidence for the two processes rests on the 
comparison between ’feel’ and ’knowing the rule’. It is true that Krashen 
compares acquisition to an intuitive feeling of grammaticality about the 
language, and learning to consciously evoking the corresponding rule. On this 
issue, McLaughlin (ibid:317) states that ’it is impossible to know whether
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subjects are actually operating on the basis of ’rale’ or ’feel", above all because 
tliis is a subjective criterion In a response to his criticism, Krashen agrees that 
’we have no physiological measure that shows an acquisition-learning difference’ 
(Krashen 1979:152) but he argues that like all research in Cognitive Psychology, 
iri which an abstract hypothesis is made and then checked to see if it accounts 
for real-world phenomena, 'the acquisition-learning distinction is an 
abstraction that predicts many observable and concrete phenomena’ (ibid). In 
this position, Krashen is supported by many important research leaders of the 
cognitive movement (Piatelli-Palmarini 1980).
Besides pointing out the lack of empirical evidence in Krashen's theory, 
McLaughlin (1978) also criticizes Krashen's evidence based on learner’s 
introspection. According to him, they are not reliable, since they cannot be tested 
empirically. In my view, this should not be pointed out as a weak point in 
Krashen’s theory, because Cognitivism makes room exactly for what 
Behaviorism refused to accept — the existence of a mental life and the 
introspective reports that account for it.
Hie most serious criticisms to introspective data in Krashen's model seem to 
be due to another cause, raised by Seliger (1983). When Krashen says that 
subconscious knowledge cannot become conscious, then this involves (again) 
the Chomskyan notions of competence and performance. The internal system 
of language or the competence system is unconscious, and as such, is 
unreachable. Our performance reflects this system, but is not necessarily 
identical to it, because other variables are involved in performance. When we 
try to describe tins internal system based on performance, we must be aware 
that we are describing an illustration of it, not the system itself. Because his 
theory is based on such theoretical tenets, Krashen could not, in principle, rely 
on introspective evidence to support lus theory.
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Seliger (1983) refers to SLA research that relies on introspective reports as 
’the psychoanalytic school of SLA’, in the sense that these retrospective reports 
on performance are to prove the learner's inner processes and his/her mental 
life. The main flaw of this line of research, according to Seliger, is that 
retrospective reports are taken as the product of competence or 'the acquired 
system', when, in fact, they are the product of performance. In other words, 
while they are elicited in order to show the process of language learning, in 
fact they show the product. This criticism makes sense, since competence in 
the Chomskyan sense (the sense being used here) is inaccessible through 
introspective awareness. For Seliger, once information is verbalized or brought 
to consciousness, it is already biased by interpretation and consequently 
different from what it was in the inner state.
In sum, Krashen proposes that two independent processes are involved in 
SLA: an subconscious one that leads to the formation of linguistic competence, 
based on internal innate capacities plus the provision of comprehensible input 
(or the focus of attention on communication rather than 011 linguistic forms); 
and a conscious one that serves as a monitor for self-correction, and that 
benefits from the formal teaching of rules. The fundamental claim of his model, 
known as the non-interface hypothesis, is that learning does not become 
acquisition, that is, the teaching of formal rules does not develop linguistic 
competence, it can only improve the monitor.
In the same way that Krashen’s theory seems intuitively right to many teachers 
and researchers, it is not considered a scientific theory by many others that claim 
it lacks empirical/experimental support. However, recent views of what can be 
considered ’scientific’ deny the need for ’positivist evidence’ as a quest for 
science. In the light of such views, Krashen’s theory would certainly be taken as 
an important contribution to the SLA field. This is specially true when we
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consider his perceptions of the SLA process, which were forerunners of so many 
ideas, such as language specificity, unconscious knowledge, the non-interface 
hypothesis, relevance of meaningful input, and failure of the rote practice- 
based methodologies, that are .now widespread among SLA theories.
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CHAPTER 4
THE TASK-BASED APPROACH
Tins chapter deals with Prabhu's task-based approach. Actually, it is a 
pedagogical approach to the teaching of a second language rather than a second 
language theory or model. However, the assumptions about learning that 
underlie this pedagogical approach constitute a significant contribution to the 
present study of acquisitional processes. Firstly in this chapter, some of 
Prabhu’s assumptions about Hie acquisitional process, such as the system, the 
process, language awareness are presented. Such assumptions provide a better 
understanding of the classroom procedures, the second issue to be presented. 
Thirdly, an analysis is made of the cognitive underpinnings of the task, followed 
by some concluding remarks.
The system
Prabhu (1987:69), proposes that learners have an internal system of rules 
which is activated whenever the learner is exposed to meaningful input in the 
second language, or in other words, when the focus of the learning task is on 
content, on meaning, on communication.
This internal system is not equal to the one described by generative 
grammarians, nor is it equal to any tentative description that linguists make of 
what they' consider to be the internal system: the internal system is much more 
complex than any descriptive grammar. It becomes clear in normal language 
use, when two levels of operation can be perceived: (1) a conscious one, where 
the language user conscious mind is busy with the message being 
communicated; and (2) an subconscious one, i.e., where his/her subconscious 
mind is simultaneously elaborating the message linguistically, in accordance 
■with grammatical rules. The simultaneity7 of these two levels shows that the 
ability to elaborate the message linguistically does not develop directly and
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consciously, but subconsciously, through focusing on meaning. Tliis is the basic 
assumption of learning and teaching that underlies the task-based approach.
Halliday (1985) perceives the unconscious nature of spoken language and 
its non-correspondence with construed grammars. He affirms that:
The sentence structure (of spoken language) is highly complex, reaching 
degrees of complexity that are rarely attained in writing. The categories of 
our language represent, unconscious slices of meaning; that is why it is so 
difficult to build a grammatical theory, because when people talk their 
unconscious choice of the language does not correspond to our conscious 
structuring of sentences and use of words. (pp.XXIV — XXVI; 
parenthesis added)
The task-based approach considers that the belief that the learner can acquire 
the internal svstem of a laneuaee bv consciously understanding and assimilating 
the grammar rules which have been described by linguists is equivocal. What 
Prabhu claims is that linguists’ grammars are conceptual, that is, they are not 
the language system per se but a probable picture of it, based on given outputs. 
In fact, outputs can provide just intuitions about the internal system; a picture of 
the system would be possible only if the system were isomorphic to available 
descriptions of it.
In this view of second language acquisition, 'planned progression' (Prabhu 
1987:73), or the creation of a prospective syllabus based on language structures 
has no place, since language develops in spiie of and not because of the 
teaching of structures. It seems that this view is in accord with the notion that 
language follows an independent route of development when triggered by 
meaning-focused tasks. This route consists of transitional systems, as posed by 
Corder (1967) in his interlanguage studies. Corder's claim is that as systems, the 
different stages of interlanguage are holistic and not itemized, as prospective 
structural syllabi suggest.
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The process
The task-based approach is based on the view that the second language system 
develops through an subconscious process, namely, siructure-abstraction. As 
defined by Prabhu (1987:69-70):
Task-based teaching operates with the concept that, while the conscious 
mind is working out some of the meaning-content, a subconscious part of 
the mind perceives, abstracts or acquires (or re-creates, as a cognitive 
structure) some of the linguistic structuring embodied in those entities, as a 
step in the development of an internal system of rules.
Besides the concept of structure-abstraction, deployment is another concept 
of fundamental importance ill Prabhu's view of language acquisition. It means 
that language abstracted while a task is being performed can be applied (used, 
transferred) to other contexts, being available for the purposes of production 
and understanding. Thus, it is said that linguistic competence achieved 
through the task-based approach is a deployable linguistic competence, 
because it is an ability that applies not only to immediate needs to express and 
understand meaning, but to the generation of language which is in accordance 
with grammatical norms.
In order for deployment in production to take place, it is believed, on Hie one 
hand, that abstract structures should be more firmly established than for 
comprehension. On the other hand, production serves to firm them up (ibid:?0-l).
Language awareness
The important point about language awareness within meaning focused 
teaching is that it is not enhanced or initiated externally by the teacher, but 
it arises spontaneously and naturally as part of the process of acquisition of a 
deployable internal system. Prabhu believes that this awareness somehow 
facilitates the learning task (ibid:76), but he does not explain in what way it 
does so.
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According to the author, awareness as a natural consequence of the 
development of the internal system differs from externally-induced awareness in 
two aspects: it arises at its own time; and it arises at its own place, that is, 
awareness may show at a certain stage of the learning process which is intrinsic 
and subconsciously determined by the learner's internal system. As such, it is 
entirely unpredictable. It may be the case that it emerges in each learner at, a 
different time, and at a different stage of development, demonstrating 
individual variability. Thus, awareness induced by the teacher may not be very 
helpful if it does not overlap with the internal system's awareness of 
language. As posed by Prabhu (ibid:76):
Attention to form which is externally initiated or manipulated is likely to 
remain unrelated to either process (i.e., of meaning-extraction or of 
structure-abstraction) and can only be a pedagogic objective in itself. 
(parenthesis added)
The natural emergence of this awareness is undeniable, but we cannot say 
that it is determined by the internal system. As will be argued in the next 
chapters, metalinguistic awareness is a characteristic of the general cognitive 
maturity present in the adult or young adult. The fact that it emerges 
spontaneously while acquisition is taking place does not mean that it is a result 
of the linguistic competence system being formed. Albeit emerging 
spontaneously, it is still conscious, and thus cannot be the product of the 
structure-abstraction process.
The pedagogy of the task-based approach
A task is defined as ’an activity w'hich required learners to arrive at an outcome 
from given information through some process of thought and which allowed 
teachers to control and regulate that process' (ibid:24). According to the task- 
based approach, class activities should offer a cognitive challenge, that is, they 
should use cognitive processes such as reasoning, inferring, and inter-relating
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information in a logical way, so as to provide the learner with a procedure in 
which s/he could focus entirely on meaning.
The class in the task-based pedagogy7 consists basically of three stages: the 
pre-task, the task, and the marking of the student's outcome of the task by the 
teacher. The pre-task is a whole-class activity guided by the teacher, which 
consists of a task that is solved by the teacher together with the class, in the 
form of interaction and negotiation. The teacher uses questions or 
instructions on the task in order to explain it. A task similar to this one is then 
given to the students in the ’task' part, for each one to solve it individually and in 
writing the only interaction being between the learner and the task. In the third 
part of the class, the teacher gives feedback to the students, by marking, their 
work not on language form, but on content. Tins part serves also as a guidance 
to the teacher in terms of Hie level of challenge that Hie task represents.
The cognitive counterpart
Prabhu compares subconscious abstraction of linguistic structures with the 
formation of cognitive structures. Cognitive structures can be inaccurate and 
incomplete at first, but with constant exposure to the target language, with 
constant effort to extract meaning from the same piece of language, which 
appears repeatedly during the three pedagogic stages, they are modified, thus 
becoming accurate, complete and firm.
Not only Hie abstraction of structures is possible through meaning-focused 
activities, but their 'elaboration' also benefits from it. Existing cognitive 
structures make it possible for new linguistic structures from new language 
samples to be understood and in this process the existing structures suffer an 
adjustment, that is, they may be firmed up, modified, extended, or integrated. 
In this way the internal system is developed, little by little.
This view of language acquisition resembles some notions developed by 
Ausubel (1978) in his view of acquisition of knowledge, the Assimilation
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Theory. In fact, a parallel can be drawn between the theories. Like Prabhu, 
Ausubel establishes that there is a cognitive structure and there follows 
hierarchically anchoring ideas, which are part of the cognitive structure. The 
most important requisite to anchor a new idea is the availability' of previous 
knowledge (anchoring ideas). Anchoring ideas also suffer a process of 
adjustment as they are exposed to new data They may be enlarged, changed or 
integrated to new ideas. The notion of deployment can also be compared to a 
similar notion in Ausubei’s theory, namely, the notion of transferability of 
newly learned material to the existing cognitive structure. Transfer, as defined 
by Ausubel (1978:166) refers to 'the impact of prior experience upon current 
learning'.
In spite of such similarities, Prabhu's concept of learning differs intrinsically 
from Ausubel's. Ausubel maintains that the cognitive structure is constructed, 
not activated, via interaction with the environment, in a very conscious manner, 
that may include practice as well. It relies principally on the environment rattier 
than on the internal system. In fact, for Ausubel, there is no internal system to 
be triggered, whai there is is an ability to acquire the language system. As we 
will see, tins constitutes a fundamental difference between theories/models that 
rely on linguistic assumptions and those which rely on psychological ones.
The cognitive underpinnings of the task: problem-solving
The task-based approach can be said to use a cognilive-oriented procedure, 
the task. It is so because the task involves a cognitive device known as problem­
solving. Problem-solving is defined by Ausubel as 'any activity in 'which both 
the cognitive representation of prior experience and the components of a 
current problem situation are reorganized in order to achieve a designated 
objective' (ibid:565). It involves sequentially two kinds of learning: reception 
and discover}7 learning.
A problem-solving task involves reception learning as it requires Hie 
understanding of the problem and the assimilation of the solution of the 
problem. In this part of problem-solving the content is presented to the learner, 
it does not have to be discovered by him/er. A problem-solving task involves 
discovery learning because hypotheses must be made up and tested using 
previous knowledge of the learner about the problem in order to find a solution 
to it. What is to be learned, that is, the content, must be discovered by the 
learner through hypothesis-testing.
Both reception and discovery learning can be meaningful, thus creating 
meaningful problem-solving, if four coditions are met: (1) the problem 
proposition is meaningful, (2) the problem proposition is reiaiabie to the 
cognitive structure, i.e., if it has background knowledge to anchor on, (3) the 
problem proposition is logical, and (4) if it has the purpose of generating a 
meaningful solution.
It is important to observe that it is not the solution to the problem that 
develops language, but the interaction with language used to perform/solve the 
task. If the problem is meaningful, though, language will not be an end in itself, 
but a means to allow the learner engage in the steps involved in the problem- 
solving.
In sum, Prabhu proposes a view of second language learning that arms at 
developing grammatical competence through reasoning tasks. In fact, however, 
such tasks are. to promote grammatical competence only indirectly: it is not that 
reasoning tasks are the triggering to the learning process — they keep the 
learner engaged intensively on exposure and interaction with the target language 
and this intensive exposure and interaction with the target language promotes 
the development of grammatical competence. (Prabhu 1987:53) Reasoning 
tasks are, therefore, much more a teaching device than a learning device.
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It seems to me that the view of the language learning process proposed by 
Prabhu is very much the same as that proposed by Krashen when he talks of 
acquisition. Their views hold Hie same assumptions, namely, that language 
develops subconsciously in the presence of and through interaction with 
meaningful Input. Prabhu actually perceives tins similarity between both 
perceptions, which emerged independently from each other. Such similarity 
reflects the convergence of the intuitions about second language research at the 
time the task-based approach was developed in India
The means through which input is made meaningful and brings about 
interaction is Hie basic difference between both proposals. While for Krashen 
'comprehensible input' is given to Hie students via communicative activities, 
which are not really explained by him, and which in turn generate interaction 
between teacher and learners or among learners, for Prabhu meaningful input is 
given through the tasks and interaction takes place between learner and task.
The influence of a linguistic Hieory becomes evident in Prabhu's proposal 
when he speaks of Chomskyan notions such as Hie competence system, the 
triggering of Hiis system by input and the process of subconscious abstraction of 
rules. At Hie same time, Hie task-based approach unravels an essential condition 
for developing competence in a second language, that is not present in linguistic 
theories: Hie focus on meaning. As will be shown, it is precisely Hiis condition 
Hial makes Prabhu's proposal so effective, and so intuitively right.
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CHAPTER 5
THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL MODEL
In this chapter, I present the Multidimensional Model, which is the model 
resulting from experimental research in SLA carried out at the University of 
Hamburg by the ZISA group (Zweitsprachenerwerb Italienischer und 
Spanischer Arbeiier), led by J. Meisel atid M. Pienemann. In tlie first part of 
this section, I present tlie model itself, which compreliends basically two 
dimensions of tlie learning process, tlie developmental and tlie variational. In 
tlie second part, I discuss tlie constructs of the model, and finally I make some 
concluding remarks concerning tlie conscious/unconscious issue.
Pienemann developed research in order to analyze how German was 
acquired by Italian and Spanish immigrants as a Second Language. He found 
that SL learners of German seemed to follow Hie same sequence of acquisition 
as they acquired syntax and certain morphemes, so he and his colleagues 
conducted extensive research in order to discover this sequence (Pienemann 
1984, 1989; Meisel, Clashen & Pienemann 1981). They found that this 
sequence was basically the same for natural and for formal second language 
acquisition. German word order rules, for instance, were acquired in tlie same 
order in natural acquisition of German as a SL as they were by learners who 
went through one year of instruction (Daniel 1983 cited in Pienemann 1989). 
According to those researchers, tins was due to the fact that the structures 
involved are based on processing prerequisites, which operate independent of 
Hie learning setting, for they are internal mechanisms. Thus, one thing that 
characterizes Pienemann’s model is that tlie internal mechanisms work in the 
same way in both natural and formal SL acquisition.
The model describes the second language acquisition process as 
multidimensional because it consists of two dimensions or two axes: a
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developmental one and a variational one. Hie developmental dimension is 
related to developmental stages that the learner undergoes during the learning 
process. But within these developmental stages there is considerable variation 
due to socio-psychological differences among learners. These differences 
constitute the variational dimension.
The developmental dimension
Developmental stages refer to stages of processing of the linguistic features. 
Developmental features of language (syntax, for instance) require processing, 
prerequisites in order to be learned and thus learning is not successful if these 
processing prerequisites are not present. Speech processing prerequisites are 
related to the reordering of underlying linguistic structures and they will be 
explained more thoroughly in the section Theoretical constructs of 
Pienemann’s model. Hie natural order implies these prerequisites, so if the 
learner is taught according to tins order, s/he will be learning according to 
her/his current level of processing. Consequently, teaching will be successful 
because it will produce learning. If however Hie learner is not yet ’ready* to 
leani these features of language, that is, does not have the processing requisites 
to learn them, teaching will be of no use. In sum, the developmental axis is 
invariant, because it is subject to processing constraints.
The teachability hypothesis, which is the heart of Pienemann's model, is 
exactly about the developmental dimension of second language acquisition. It 
says that,
Teaching is ineffectual (i.e. impossible) since L2 acquisition can only be 
promoted when the learner is ready to acquire the given items in the natural 
context (Pienemann 1989:61).
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An example of developmental features from studies of English as a SL 
follows (adapted from Pienemann & Johnston 198? cited in Larsen-Freeman & 
Long 1991):
Developmental feature: feinl person singular -s
Third person singular -s is a stage X+3, because it requires ability to use string-internal 
movement ({his refers to movement of elements inside the utterance, or rearrangement o f the 
utterance order), which will be demonstrated below:
1) In stage X, the learner produces canonical SVO order 
Ex, You are student? (SVO?)
Ino like. (no+X)
1 like Sydney. (SVO)
2) In stage X+l, s/he moves elements to the front of the utterance. This does not disturb, 
however, the canonical SVO order
Ex. In Vietnam, lam  teacher, (adv-fionting)
Do you have apartment? (Do-fronting)
Why you no eat? (Wh-fionting)
3) In stage X+2, the canonical SVO order is disturbed by movement of string-internal elements 
to initial or final position. Grammatical knowledge is also required for identification of 
movable elements.
Ex. Have you job? (yes/no inversion)
1 like to eat my friend house, (complementizer insertion)
You can take your coat off. (particle separation)
4) In stage X+3, movement of elements happens which requites recognition that elements 
moved are members of certain grammatical categories. Third per son singular -s is acquired. 
Ex. She eats too much, (third singular -s)
Why did you go? (aux past, wife agreement)
She does not know, (do third p., with agreement)
I wrote it myself, (reflexive pronoun)
He gave the money to the police, (dative to)
The variational dimension
The oilier dimension that describes the second language acquisition 
process is the variational, which, as mentioned above, is related to socio- 
psychological differences among learners. Of these differences, attitude and 
motivation seem to play the most important role. They determine what kind of 
transitional system certain groups of learners use during their learning 
process. For instance, on one hand, there are learners who are more
38
segregatively-oriented towards the target language, that is, they have, less contact 
with native-speakers arid do not have a very positive attitude towards the target 
culture. It was found that these learners tended to use the strategy of 
restrictive simplification (omission of grammatical items which are not 
communicatively relevant, but are obligatory in use; ex. Julia happy; she eat 
sandwich) when learning the SL. On the other hand, there are learners who are 
integratively-oriented, they have a positive attitude towards Hie target culture 
and have more contact with native-speakers. These learners tended to use 
elaborative simplification (insertion of grammatical items; ex. he wented, theys 
go). In sum, the socio-psychological profile of learners (i.e. segregative or 
integrative) determined the kind of strategy of simplification they used 
(restrictive or elaborative), showing that different learner groups use/produce 
different transitional systems. This shows us, in turn, that the SLA. process is 
not linear in the sense of being simply a gradation of competences from zero to 
target competence, as it used to be described, but that it is multidimensional, 
showing variation within the dimensions.
An important aspect of the variational dimension that must be discussed is 
that because it is determined by socio-psychological factors rather than by 
processing factors, the variational features are not subject to leamabilily 
constraints. Hence, they can be taught independently of a natural order, 
because they do not require processing prerequisites. Once variational 
features can be produced by the learner, it is said that they can be taught, 
and their teaching will be effective. Hie insertion/omission of the copula is a 
good example of a variational feature. Some learners produce equative 
sentences (i.e. with the copula) correctly at early stages, while others omit the 
copula even at more advanced stages (for ex. he good; Jane hungry). The 
developmental stages do not affect the use of the copula, whereas instruction 
does. In his studies, Pienemann demonstrates that the frequency of the
39
omission of the copula decreased significantly after its teaching (Hyltenstam and 
Pienemann 1985). In sum, the acquisition of variational features is not 
constrained by the processing capacity.
Reviewing, Pienemann’s work was triggered by the results of previous studies 
that show that interlanguage structures produced by learners who received 
formal instruction and structures produced by those who went through natural 
acquisition were quite similar. From ins findings, Pienemann attempted to 
explain whether formal instruction plays a positive role in SL acquisition, and if 
so, in what context it produces better results. He concluded that the learner 
follows a set of developmental principles which apply to both formal and 
natural SL development. When these developmental principles are respected, 
i.e., when instruction is given to the learner according to his/her level of 
processing capacity and consequently according to the natural order, then it 
influences the acquisition process positively, in at least three ways: it speeds up 
the acquisition process, it improves the frequency of rule application, and it 
improves the context of application of rules. However, when the processing 
constraints are not observed, instruction is not only ineffective, but also 
detrimental: studies carried out by Pienemann (1989) show that when the 
learner has to learn a structure for which s/he is not ready, s/he starts using 
the strategy of avoidance of that structure, which is not helpful to the 
learning process; on the contrary, it inhibits the learner's production.
This does not mean that instruction should be left aside, however. Since 
variational features of acquisition are not constrained by instruction, teaching 
may serve to develop them in the learner, and for that reason, instruction must 
not be abandoned, in spite of the difficulties in establishing the teaching 
order.
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The theoretical constructs of Pieaemann's model
1) Concerning the acquisitional view
Pienemann's model is influenced by the work of Corder (1967) as far as the 
acquisitions! process is concerned (Hyltenstam & Pienemann 1985:41-2).
Corder (1967), in his first studies on interlanguage, suggested that second 
language acquisition is the product of a process similar to first language 
acquisition, which follows a natural and predictable order. Some years later, 
Carder (1973 cited in Hyltenstam & Pienemann 1985:41-2) developed this view 
and proposed that if adults showed the same internal mechanisms to learn an 
SL as a child did for his/her LI, then it could be assumed that second language 
learners would also follow a predictable order in the acquisition of SL. This 
assumption implies that there are some processes or operations (Pienemann 
calls them strategies) within the learning process winch are universal, 
independent of the learning context or of the source language. These processes 
determine the order in which structures are acquired, according to the level of 
processing complexity they require.
2) Concerning the processing strategies
Pienemann’s attempts to explain the processing strategies are based on a 
model of sentence processing first proposed by Bever (1970), Fedor, Bever & 
Garret (1974), Bever & Townsend (1979), and Forster (1979) (all cited in 
Pienemann 1984:199) and then developed by the ZISA group.
The model basically relies on the view emerging from research on 
sentence comprehension and production, that processing capacity - in syntax - 
'results from reorderings and restructurings of various levels of underlying 
linguistic units' (Clashen 1982 cited in Pienemann 1984:199). These reorderings 
and restructurings may evolve in two ways: 1) through an autonomous linguistic 
level of processing containing a grammatical processor winch is task-specific,
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that is, processes grammatical tasks only, and 2) through a problem-solving 
component (GPS - General Problem Solving) which is not task-specific. The 
strategies of the GPS require less processing capacity than grammatical 
operations, because they use direct access between underlying structure and 
surface forms, as if it were a shortcut. Thus, learners will first produce structures 
which conform to the strategies of the GPS. However, certain complex 
linguistic structures cannot be processed by the GPS strategies, because the GPS 
is not task-specific. So, they are processed by the grammatical processor, in the 
following sequence: those that require the lowest processing capacity will be 
acquired first. The general conclusion is that 'rules which require a high degree 
of processing capacity are acquired late' (ibid).
There is a hierarchy of processing complexity which derives from the 
number of strategies deployed when producing the structures and from 
memory-load involved in the grammatical operations.
To conclude this line of thought, I would say that the Teachability 
Hypothesis posits that the sequence of acquisition is constrained primarily by 
levels of processing capacity (i.e., the more time/difficulty a structure takes to be 
processed, the more complex it is), and only indirectly or consequently by 
linguistic complexity.
The theoretical constructs of ins model imply the following assumptions:
1 In relation to the process through which a second language is developed, it 
can be said that in Pienemann's model that process is the result of ’the 
unconscious system of language processing’ (Pienemann 1984:207). Also 
because it develops through a natural route, it resembles acquisition, in the 
Krashian sense. However, it seems that only developmental features undergo 
an acquisitional process.
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2 When instruction is given to learners without respect for the Teachability 
Hypothesis, or the processing constraints, it produces a kind of knowledge 
which is similar to Krashen’s learned knowledge, that is, it is not available in 
natural/fluent speech, it takes time to be evoked, and does not turn into 
acquired knowledge; or, as put by Pienemann (ibid.206),
...this learning cannot result in actual use of the structure in normal speech 
(inside or outside the classroom) since processing it is not possible on the 
basis of the procedures available to the learner at this point in the 
development.
3 Variational features seem not to be the product of the internal system nor 
of the acquisition process, since they depend on external factors to develop, such 
as teaching and degree of acculturation.
Pienemann's work provides evidence for universalist assertions — he 
demonstrates that formal instruction has no effect whatsoever if it is based on a 
sequence different from the natural sequence, which remains the same 
independently of the native language or of the learning setting. Yet, his model is 
limited by the natural orders found, most of them related to morpheme 
acquisition.
With respect to the process of SLA, I see this model as a psycholinguistic 
model influenced by linguistics (the notion of UG, natural route, unconscious 
learning strategies) for I consider that the determining factors in acquisition are 
the internal ones; they prevail over input. However, his model is considered 
mteractionist in SLA literature because it brings in both innate and 
environmental factors in order to explain second language acquisition. In fact, 
this is the great strength of the model — it is able to explain how internal 
factors and socio-psychological factors interact in order to produce the 
linguistic features.
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CHAPTER 6
SELIGER
In tins section I intend to discuss Seliger's view on SLA his conception of 
the acquisition process, which is consistent with neurolinguistic findings, and 
which involves basically two kinds of knowledge -  linguistic and 
metalinguistic; his particular perspective of verbal reports, and finally the 
validity of verbal reports to other areas of research in SLA
Despite the fact that Seliger does not have a model, his perceptions 
constitute an important contribution to the explanation of SLA He and 
Sharwood Smith (in his current view) are the (psycho)linguists who come 
closest to the neurolinguistic view. In spite of the Chomskyan influence in 
aspects such as the unconsciousness and the inaccessibility of the competence 
system, lie seems to be able to distinguish theoretical/linguistic notions from 
notions that have psycho/neurological reality. This may be due to his 
involvement in neurolinguistic research.
The influence of neurolinguistic research on Seliger's view 
In his 1978 article, 'Implications of a multiple critical period hypothesis for 
SLL', Seliger reviews neurolinguistic literature related to the subject of the 
critical period for adult acquisition of second languages He concludes that 
there are multiple critical periods for the acquisition of a language in one’s 
lifetime, due to various changes that take place in the brain as a result of 
maturation. Tins is known as the completeness hypothesis (ibid: 11). These 
changes, namely, loss of plasticity, lateralization (the concentration of language 
functions in one hemisphere of the brain), and localization of different 
functions in the two hemispheres weaken/decrease language acquisition abilities 
gradually and successively. Seliger attributes tins natural weakness
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preponderantly to plasticity; however, until some years ago it was believed that 
lateralization was the predominant cause. This hypothesis is not accepted any 
longer by most neurolinguists.
According to Seliger, being a biological function, plasticity decreases with age, 
affecting different aspects of language at different stages. While there is 
plasticity in the brain, it is possible to acquire a second language just by being 
exposed to meaningful input, and tins process produces propositional language 
in the learner, that is, language that is integrated into the linguistic system. Once 
plasticity is lost, it is not possible to acquire a language simply by being 
exposed to meaningful input. A different kind of learning takes place then, a type 
of classroom learning, which relies on practice rather than just on exposure to 
input. This kind of learning produces what has more recently been called 
declarative knowledge. It is not language per se but iaagu age-like behavior, in 
Chomsky's terms (Chomsky 1975 cited in Krashen 1985:102).
The acquisition of the phonological system of a language is the most typical 
example of tins process (for reasons that are extensively discussed in Seliger 
1978). Hie phonological system is acquirable up to puberty and never post- 
pubertaHy, because of the reduced plasticity in the area of the brain responsible 
for its acquisition.
A general tendency is to compensate for tins natural weakness by stimulating 
right brain areas which have a similar (but not identical) ability. It is possible to 
get meaning out of written or spoken input as chunks, for instance, because 
tins involves the synthetic ability of the right hemisphere, but it is not possible to 
make analysis of the input (i.e. to sort complex auditory parameters into 
phonetic features), using the right hemisphere, because tins is a left-brain 
ability7 subject to decrease due to the loss of plasticity.
The same attempt to compensate for this natural weakness happens in the 
second language classroom, when a learner is having difficulty in acquiring a
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language aspect that has under gone a 'critical period’, ss in the case of 
phonology. The general tendency of the teacher in that case is to emphasize 
fomi divorced from meaning, in a behaviorist-like practice, such as drilling or 
repealing. In fact, right-hemisphere functions — memorization of chunks, in 
this case — are being used to compensate for left-hemisphere deficits. However, 
this practice is nothing more than rote learning and it is not useful even for 
the second type of learning, namely, classroom learning, let alone propositional 
learning. This second type of learning, according to Seliger, does not turn into 
propositional learning (leaving aside the matter of rote learning), and when 
propositional learning in a certain area of language reaches its critical period, this 
cannot be overcome, it is simply not available anymore.
Seiiger’s view o f the  acquisition process
1) linguistic knowledge
Seliger sees acquisition as an active process, in opposition to behaviorism, 
which views the learner as a passive receptor, in winch the leaning material is not 
processed, changed or recoded: input equals output. In Seliger's (1979:366) 
view, however, the learner reconstructs an internal model , using induction, 
deduction, and hypothesis-testing Induction, it seems, plays a major role in the 
process of learning: ’Learning depends on the inductive abilities of the learner" 
(ibid:368). Language input is decoded and recoded before it is assimilated into 
the learner’s cognitive structure. There is no chance of the learning material 
being assimilated without being recoded first, and tins decoding depends very 
much on the learner's perception of it. Thus, information, is perceived and stored 
by every learner in a different way. Mien Seliger talks of ’perceiving’ the 
learning material he is not implying any level of consciousness, on the contrary,
I would say that 'perceiving' is a very unconscious process in Seliger's view. 
This process leads to the formation of an individual system of unconscious
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rules inaccessible through introspection. Some part of the input, however, 
may not be immediately assimilated, because the learner may not be cognitively 
ready for it. This notion reports us back to Pienemmann’s notion of ’cognitive 
prerequisites', where the teaching of formal rules is not as efficient if the 
cognitive prerequisites for a certain structure are not there
One important feature of Seliger’s view is that he maintains that there is no 
direct access to the internal grammar. One can only know about it indirectly 
through performance, through expressed behavior, lie claims. In the 
neurolinguistic section we will see that this claim does have neurological reality: 
we do have an implicit competence to acquire the linguistic system, but we have 
no direct access to it (see chapter on neurolinguistics). We can infer that a 
grammar is being formed by the external behavior that is observed. The form 
of tins grammar, however, is unknown because it is inaccessible. So, what we 
have are different theories (Generative, Connectionist) created by linguists that 
try to describe tins grammar. The grammar produced by them is a conscious, 
theoretic^ one.
2) Metalinguistic knowledge
Besides linguistic knowledge, there is another type of knowledge which 
does not result from the acquisition process, and that is metalinguistic 
knowledge. It consists of metalanguage, or knowledge about the language, and 
it is perfectly verbalizable. Conscious rules explicitly taught are stored in the 
form of metalinguistic knowledge  ^ As posed by Seliger (1979:366), this is 
Hie monitor, in the very sense that Krashen uses tins word. Also, this is Hie type 
of knowledge educed when introspections are performed.
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V erbal reports in Sefiger’s view
Seliger has a very strotig position in relation to the use of introspective 
methods in SLA_ As a result of his beliefs in a linguistic competence which is 
unconscious and thus inaccessible, he criticizes research that uses introspections 
as evidence for linguistic competence or for linguistic processing. He refers to 
that as the 'psychoanalytic school of SLA', which is an orientation of recent 
studies in SLA which rely on verbal reports of learners. This orientation is so 
called because it takes learner's reports as 'evidence for the inner workings of 
the learner's mind' (Seliger 1983:185). Other psycholinguists and second 
language researchers interested in language processing (as Deese, for instance, 
cited in Dechert 1987) also share tins position concerning verbal reports.
In. this context, it seems that Seliger*s (ibid: 183) definition of introspection is 
justified: introspections are 'conscious verbalizations of what we think we know1 
. In his view, they serve to show how learners use acquired knowledge, and 
not how they acquired that knowledge (Seliger cited in Cohen 1987:88). That is, 
they reveal strategies used by learners, which lie calls tactics and which, 
according to him, are potentially conscious.
According to Seliger (1983:188), the main reasons why verbal reports are not 
evidences of internal processes are the following:
1 According to psychological literature, conscious operations do not reach 
unconscious operations — they belong to different, separate paradigms. While 
conscious operations are controlled and demand intentional awareness, 
unconscious operations are automatic, not reaching the level of awareness, 
and thus cannot be verbalized;
2 In order to obtain reports, learners have to attend to their own output, a 
task generally known as monitoring, and which overloads the memory system, 
hampering production;
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3 Research on memory shows that the learner may be aware of much of 
his/her processing, but only while it is stored in short-term memory, that is, 
during some seconds. After that, information stored in short-term memory is 
encoded in a different form from that in winch it was received, and the 
previous form is discarded. This is the time necessary for comprehension of 
meaning to take place. Hence, the linguistic processing that takes place while 
attention is available is not related to what is verbalized afterwards. They are 
two separate things.
4 The learner is not skilled or equipped to describe his procedural 
competence (even if s/he had access to it). That is the task of a researcher 
(linguist, psychologist) who is familiar with abstractions, linguistic rules, 
strategies. As a consequence, nothing can assure the researcher that the 
learner is describing the process used to acquire/produce a linguistic 
structure. S/He might well being guessing, creating, or inferring based on her/his 
output.
5 The same holds for interpreting learner's verbalizations: while these are the 
product of the interlanguage system of the learner, the point of reference of the 
researcher when interpreting these verbalizations (his/her intuitions used to 
interpret them) is his/her system. Hie result is an analysis of the learner's 
reports from the linguist’s point-of-view. It is as if two language items were 
being compared without reference to the linguistic contexts from which they 
were extracted.
Verbal reports and other areas
Not all researchers in the field of second language hold the same position as 
Seliger concerning the validity of introspective data to explain current questions 
of research such as how a language is acquired or processed. Dechert (1987) is 
one in favor of such use, thus opposing Seliger. He makes an important
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clarification about this matter (ibid): psycholinguists interested in first and 
second language processing do not recognize the psychological validity of 
introspective reports, while cognitive scientists do. Because of their diverse 
acceptance by researchers in the field, introspective data are used differently m 
the areas of cognitive science and language processing: in the first case, verbal 
reports are taken to shed light on mental processes that happen during Hie 
performance of a cognitive task, be the task verbal or not. They are seen as data 
to characterize cognitive stages that lead to the solution of a problem. Hie focus 
is on what is reported, and not on how it is reported. In the second case, 
language processing research, verbal reports are taken as revelations about Hie 
verbalization process. Here, the hoM’ is the focus, and not the what. This can be 
better visualized in the sketch below:
Cognitive Science Language Processing
They serve to identify mental 
processes dating the solution 
of a cognitive task whose 
structure and rules are known. 
They disclose the movements 
and sequences of movements.’
y
Content o f reports
...............................................
They are documents of 
processing whose inherent 
structure and rules are neither 
known to the processor nor to 
the researcher. They serve to 
reveal the verbalization 
process.'
?
Form of reports
Fig.l How verbal reports are used in Cognitive Science and in Language 
Processing research (based on Dechert 1987:88)
The fundamental thinking that underlies the role of introspective reports in 
Cognitive Science is that the human information-processing system is unified, 
that is, the processing of linguistic tasks is the same as the processing of non- 
linguistic tasks; both use the same mental processes. That is the reason why
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cognitive scientists advocate tlie psychological validity of verbal reports, and 
it might also be the reason why psycholinguists resist accepting this validity. 
Seeing language as an independent module of cognition, they assume that it is 
acquired, stored and processed differently from other kinds of abilities.
Besides Dechert, Cohen (1987:88) is also favorable to the use of 
introspective reports in SLA, stating that mentalistic studies in the field of SLA 
prove more and more the validity of introspective reports in this field, although 
some linguists, especially Seiiger, still object.
In contesting the objections of psycholinguists in relation to verbal reports, 
Dechert (1987:97) argues that introspective reports can reveal at least three types 
of information: information that is stored in short-term memory, in the focus of 
attention; information that is not attended to when stored in short-term 
memory, but that through activation and reorganization becomes accessible and 
verbalizable, and declarative knowledge, which, different from procedural 
knowledge, is accessible for verbalization.
The issue of introspective reports is extremely important in SLA research, 
specially when we consider that underlying it are the notions of competence and 
performance, which are, in turn, associated to the consciousness issue. 
Questions are raised in tins discussion, such as: Are introspective reports the 
result of competence or performance? How can they be Hie result of 
competence if they are conscious, while the competence system is 
unconscious and inaccessible? Why, then are performative reports taken to 
mirror competence? Is there really a competence system, unconscious, as 
Chomsky said?
Seiiger offers us answers to these questions. He says,'Obviously, it is at the 
unconscious level that language learning takes place' (1983:187). Thus, 
conscious introspective reports cannot explain how tins learning takes place. This
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might be a daring position considering the present 'psychoanalytic school’ that 
pervades SLA, but it is also a position consistent with its Chomskyan influence 
and, what is more, with neurolinguistic findings (at least with those presented in 
this dissertation). It shows clearly that both views cannot stand together — 
introspection and neurolinguistics. Perhaps tlial is why neurolinguistics relies so 
heavily on observations rather than on introspections. Seliger’s position also 
shows that, introspection is not congruent with Chomskyan notions such as 
competence. But, above all, it makes remarkably clear that such Chomskyan 
notions are congruent with neurolinguistic findings.
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CHAPTER 7
SHARWOOD SMITH
Sharwood Smith’s model, influenced by Linguistics and by the work of 
Chomsky, holds that language learning (at least a part of it) is developed in a 
language-specific mode, which is still available to the adult learner. Actually, 
his view consists of two phases, an early one which was a reaction to the new 
methodologies based on the ’creative construction approach'; and a recent one, 
influenced by the work of Fodor (1983) on modularity. In this recent work, he 
improves on what was previously considered a hypothesis into a self-contained 
proposal of bilingual processing.
EARLY VIEW
linguistics and language pedagogy
As stated above, the early work of Sharwood Smith (Rutherford & Sharwood 
Smith 1985; Bialystok & Sharwood Smith 1985; Sharwood Smith 1986) was a 
reaction to the new methodologies that arose after the era of Modem 
Linguistics, from 1954 onwards, as for instance the natural approach of Krashen 
& Terrell (1983). These new methodologies were based on the view that an 
environment similar to that of first language acquisition was the best one for the 
development of a second language. Tins view was influenced by the creative 
constructionists (Duiay, Burt & Krashen 1982), who, according to Sharwood 
Smith (1986:239), believed that Theoretical Linguistics had very little to offer 
to language pedagogy. In other words, the use of knowledge about the language 
would not contribute to the learning of that language. Several important names of 
the Applied Linguistics field, such as Widdowson, Brumfit and Johnson (cited in 
Bialystok & Sharwood Smith 1985) reiterated such a belief, underestimating 
the goal of Theoretical Linguistics. Theoretical Linguistics is not merely the
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description of language structure, as posed by the linguists, and thus useless to 
language pedagogy, but indeed its goal is 'an understanding of the workings of 
the mind* and in this way it can be considered as revealing to the learning 
process as Cognitive Psychology, or perhaps a branch of it, as claimed by 
Chomsky (1972:28,88). The outcome of Linguistic research is a description, but 
by no means the description of language structure (Generative grammar, for 
instance) can be considered an end in itself. In fact, the theoretical nature of 
Linguistics can be attributed to its ultimate goal: the development of theories to 
explain abstr act phenomena of Hie mind, as constructs and processes.
Sharwood Smith's view is a reaction against the thinking that brought 
about the new methodologies, Hie thinking that Linguistics is of no help to 
language pedagogy. He claims that teaching formal properties of the language 
(i.e., raising awareness of the language in the learner) might be useful, at least in 
certain moments of the learning process.
The acquisition process
According, to the early view of Sharwood Smith, two processes take place in 
the mind as it is stimulated by input: comprehension and acquisition. 
Comprehension is defined as 'the decoding of particular messages winch have 
been encoded in linguistic form’ and acquisition as ’the creation of new mental 
structures which we call grammatical competence' (Sharwood Smith 1986:239). 
This means that input has dual relevance, that is, while it is being attended to 
for its meaning, or processed for comprehension, as the author says, structures 
present in the input that are relevant to the learner’s competence at the moment 
(at the 'i+1' level, in Krashen's terms, 'optimum or leamable input', in 
Pienemann's terms) are being acquired, abstracted, or processed for 
acquisition, in Ins terms. Other structures will be acquisitionally irrelevant at 
tins moment, for the learner may not be 'ready' for them, in Pienemann's sense.
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The formation of L2 competence triggered by input is essentially a creative 
process, free from LI transfer, in the sense that this process is not a 'copy of 
the first language competence system, but it is a creation of an entirely new 
system. In Krashen's words, it is the acquisition process. Tins process of L2 
formation is similar to that of first language acquisition, but it depends on 
additional resources (as for instance, the metalinguistic ability) which will be 
discussed later. These processes are involved in the formation of a transitory 
system known as 'interlanguage'. According to the author, this system has a bi- 
dimensional facet: it is composed of knowledge representation and control 
(Bialystok & Sharwood Smith 1985:104,5). Bialystok & Sharwood Smith are 
not clear as to whether there is only one process responsible for the creation of 
the competence system and for controlling/accessing it in language use. Noi are 
they clear as to how the acquisition process accounts for its twofold function. 
What is clear is that the general process responsible for the construction of 
interlanguage lias a twofold function: creating mental representations of the 
target language, and developing procedures for accessing, these mental 
representations.
The claim that the SLA process is the same as the first language process is 
based on analysis of the interlanguage data of learners of second languages. The 
interlanguage data produced was so similar to the first language data that there 
was no need to suppose that other processes were involved beyond the ones 
proposed by the authors.
Figure 1 aims at clarifying this bi-dimensional facet involved in 
interlanguage.
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Mental representations of the TL
(organized and systematic linguistic information)
Interlanguage system
Control mechanisms
(procedures for accessing this information)
Fig.l Sharwood Smith's view of the inierlanguage system
We may infer that the acquisition process implies analysis (see glossary), 
because die author says that knowledge of the TL is developed to Hie extent that 
analysis and reanalysis are done. An increase in analysis means an increase in 
competence. Analysis turns chunks of knowledge abstracted by the learner into 
creative language, that is, into structures that can be used independently, applied 
to new contexts. Besides, analysis also discloses the organizing principles of the 
language.
It is important to note that, in this view, analysis is not linked to the 
development of metalinguistic awareness, necessarily: 'increasing analysis does 
not imply an increase in conscious awareness of structure on Hie part of the 
learner" (Bialystok & Sharwood Smith 1985:107), which means that the analysis 
task is possibly accomplished subconsciously.
M etalinguistic aw areness
Metalinguistic awareness is a key-word in the view of Sharwood Smith, and 
is a topic quite relevant for my discussion of the (unconsciousness of SLA, 
which justifies the presence of his work in this study. Since the early phase of 
Ins work, the author lias been overtly intrigued by the role of metalinguistic 
awareness in SLA, brought about by consciousness-raising (C-R from now on). 
The notion of C-R in that phase takes a common meaning in the area: 'the
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deliberate attempt to draw Hie learner's attention specifically to the formal 
properties of the target language1 (Rutherford & Sharwood Smith 1985:274). In 
the second phase, we will see that it becomes a much more technical notion, 
whose meaning is more complex -  and more precise. Thus, he is going to make 
a difference between 'sporadic insights into aspects of language' that even 
children have available at an early age, and which lie calls metalinguistic 
awareness, and 'the more elaborate (encyclopedic) knowledge about the formal 
properties of the language gained during formal education.', called 
metalinguistic "knowledge (Sharwood Smith 1991:20-1). Here, the focus is on 
the notion used in the first phase, which will be extensively discussed below.
Consciousness-raising
The particular view of C-R held by Sharwood Smith in the first phase of 
his work gave rise to a hypothesis known as the Pedagogical Grammar 
Hypothesis (Rutherford & Sharwood Smith 1985:277).
Consciousness-raising may be described as having degrees o f elaboration, 
that is, the teaching of a grammatical feature can be explicit (as in the case of a 
given rule) or implicit (exposing the learner to crucial, pre-programmed data, 
and letting him induce the rules). Another option would be not to stress nor 
suppress any grammatical feature, but just to ignore them. In any case, the fact 
is that the choice between the degrees of elaboration, or even of not choosing a 
degree at all, is usually made by the teacher on the basis of his/her intuitions of 
what is simpler to learn and what is more complex. Sharwood Smith states that 
the decisions on complexity or simplicity must be principled, not random, and 
principled on the basis of a constant factor. He proposes that aspects of 
Universal Grammar be that constant factor. This proposal lead to the 
Pedagogical Grammar Hypothesis, which does not aim at being a modeL as he
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says, but rather a hypothesis on how to teach certain linguistic structures in 
terais of C-R, and whether to teach them at all.
The Pedagogical Grammar Hypothesis (PGH from now on) states that 
explicit teaching of linguistic aspects can facilitate and even accelerate the 
process of acquisition (when compared to natural acquisition) if given under 
certain conditions, while the absence of explicit teaching where/when needed may 
slow down the process. As said before, the 'conditions’ referred to here are 
related to principles and parameters of UG. Now, what exactly does that mean?
Hie PGH is based on certain assumptions derived from modem Generative 
theory. One of these assumptions is that the second language learner is endowed 
with certain principles of Universal Grammar (see glossary). Such principles 
are thought to be available for Hie second language learner and the author 
enumerates research that demonstrates this (ibid:277).
Another assumption that underlies the PGH is that UG principles are constant 
for all language learners. His point is that those principles do not need to 
undergo any degree of C-R, that is, they should not be given (implicitly or 
explicitly) attention in the PG. On the other hand, aspects that vary among 
languages, the parameters, must be considered in the PG — they deserve some 
degree of elaboration of C-R. The parameters constitute aspects of difficulty for 
SL learners, and the degree of elaboration of C-R used for each parameter will 
depend on the difficulties posed by these aspects in each language. For instance, 
the notion that the sentence obeys a certain order, as well as the notion of 
canonical order, is a UG principle, which does not have to be taught, according 
to the PGH. However, the notion of dropping the subject (PRO-drop) is an aspect 
specific to the language being learned, that is, a parameter, and as such it must 
be taught. Now, whetlier its teaching will be explicit or implicit, tins will depend 
on the language. In English, as well as in French, dropping the subject or object
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is not allowed, while in Portuguese it is. Such a rale can be learned more rapidly 
if taught than if it remains to be acquired spontaneously via positive evidence.
But whatever the degree of elaboration used, implicit or explicit, the fact is 
that it is his claim that the use of degrees of C-R in the teaching of these 
aspects will accelerate their acquisition. In sum, C-R is considered 'a potential 
facilitator for the acquisition of linguistic competence', although not the only 
one (ibid:280).
Input enhancement
In lus 1993 paper, Sharwood Smith presents the term input enhancement as 
a substitute for the former term consciousness-raising (Rutherford & 
Sharwood Smith 1985). Tins change in terminology was due to the former 
word implying a certain state of mind of the learner, from unconscious or 
subconscious to conscious, which suggests that all input becomes intake, and 
which is not true at all. The fact that the teacher (or available input) raises 
consciousness in the learner about a certain aspect or structure of the language 
does not mean that the learner acquired that structure, that it became intake. 
Unfortunately, research in SLA. has not yet reached the point of specifying 
under which conditions a certain aspect of the input becomes acquired (intake). 
What we know, and which is relatively unanimous in SLA research presently, is 
that input must be relevant and meaningful in order to trigger any acquisition. 
Tins is exactly the meaning of input enhancement here: input might be 
manipulated so that it becomes more or less appropriate to acquisition, more or 
less relevant. But whether this manipulated input will reach its aims is another 
issue that might deserve a much more extensive discussion than is appropriate 
here.
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RECENT VIEW: Language processing
Sharwood Smith's (1991) recent view is largely influenced by the modularity 
thesis, in particular by the works of Fodor (1983) and Jackendoff (1987). 
Following ids earlier view that linguistic processing has two dimensions, 
knowledge representation and knowledge control (Fig. 1), lie now elaborates on 
that same view, reaching a satisfactory answer at least for how one of Hie two 
dimensions — the knowledge representation dimension — is structured in the 
mind. The answer lies in the modularity thesis and it seems to be successful, 
since his proposal brings him to the same conclusions as those of the 
neurolinguistic view, whose merits he in having been developed solely from 
observable data.
Note that Sharwood Smith uses the expression language processing in his 
recent phase to refer both to the build up of knowledge representation and the 
on-line control of this knowledge. For this dissertation, only the knowledge 
representation dimension is relevant, because it is this one that deals with the 
acquisition of grammatical competence and the processes involved in it. 
Thus, following him, I will call that dimension of his model language 
processing, although tins use differs from the general use I adopted in tins 
dissertation.
The knowledge control dimension will be left aside for not being pertinent to 
Ous study. Besides, as just mentioned, while the author readies a satisfactory 
solution for the knowledge representation dimension, namely, the modularity, 
the same assurance does not hold for the knowledge control dimension, which is 
still speculative.
According to Fodor (ibid), knowledge in general (including linguistic 
knowledge) is compartmentalized in modules in the human mind, which are 
self-contained, encapsulated, independent of each other but somehow related to 
each other. The linguistic module is internally divided according to the divisions
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of the inertial grammar proposed by Chomsky. Not only the internal modules of 
the linguistic module emanate from Chomsky, but if we reconsider the notions 
of implicit and explicit knowledge, we will see that implicit knowledge has its 
roots in the Chomskyan notion of linguistic competence -  knowledge that is 
subconscious and inaccessible to introspection. Now, explicit knowledge seems 
to be out of the scope of linguistic competence — in fact, it refers to 
metalinguistic competence, a subject that has not been overtly discussed by 
Chomsky, but yet this covertness might be meaningful: metalinguistic 
awareness cannot be part of linguistic competence, since it is not subconscious 
knowledge. In any case, going back to Chomsky brings a better understanding 
to Fodorsideas and consequently to the work of Sharwood Smith.
The central idea of a modular mental processor is that linguistic 
knowledge is not only a separate module from other kinds of knowledge (see 
Fig.2A.and 2B), but is also acquired in a different way and retrieved in a different 
way.
Like other input systems (visual, auditory, and so on), the linguistic system 
works in a reflexive, automatic way: that is, whenever these systems are 
triggered by input (external stimulus), they have a mandatory, automatic 
reaction, a reflex. Thus, we cannot avoid understanding a linguistic message 
when we are exposed to it: comprehension is automatic, reflexive. In other 
words, the use of the linguistic system is automatic, but use will not be 
discussed further here.
The acquisition of the linguistic system or mental grammar is a process 
specific to language: that is, it does not follow general cognitive development. 
Tins process is constrained by universal principles known as Universal 
Grammar. The principles are biologically inherited or inborn. Because tins 
process is essentially a creative one, the learner comes to know much more 
about the linguistic system than what is taught to him/her, and notably in the
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absence of negative evidence. The cliild has little or no negative evidence at 
her/his disposal. As for the adult, it could be argued that the negative evidence 
provided by teaching is 25systematic, inconstant and fragmentary, assuming that 
adults make use of the same process of acquisition as the child. However, this is 
only partially true. The adult lias available an important resource for learning a 
second language, namely, metalinguistic knowledge, and that, makes all the 
difference. Most aspects of the second language are acquired consciously, and 
thus belong to another type of knowledge, known as encyclopedic knowledge, 
which is processed differently from linguistic knowledge. Pragmatics, lexico- 
seniantics and parts of morphology are encyclopedic knowledge, requiring 
consciousness to be processed. However, this does not hold for phonology, 
syntax and some aspects of morphology. They are processed within the 
linguistic module. As for syntax, studies have shown that negative evidence is 
not only unnecessary7 but also useless to its development in the adult second 
language learner (Sharwood Smith 1991.13; Pienemann [see respective chapter]).
Still an important point about the development of linguistic knowledge is that 
it does not improve with cognitive maturation. It reaches its climax at puberty7, 
and from then on the ability to acquire the different aspects of language suffers a 
successive and constant decrease. Tins is know  as 'the multiple critical period 
hypothesis' and is discussed at length in the chapter on Seliger .
Encyclopedic knowledge is defined as 'our knowledge of history and physics, 
as well as our idiosyncratic knowledge of events, people and places' (Sharwood 
Smith 1991:11) By his definition, it seems that Sharwood Smith uses the term 
mcycopedic knowledge as a cover term for both encyclopedic (conceptual 
knowledge) and episodic knowledge (knowledge of events). Tins cover term 
should actually be declarative knowledge, as we will see in the neurolinguistic 
chapter.
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Encyclopedic knowledge is processed within what Fodor calls the ’central 
processor*, which is a module responsible for general cognitive development. It 
is acquired consciously and it is subject to scrutinity, analysis, conscious 
manipulation, reflection. The acquisition of this type of knowledge involves 
induction, which is an ability that improves with cognitive maturation. It has 
some degree of similarity with Ausubel's discovery learning.
The use of encyclopedic knowledge is at first slow and laborious (some 
authors call this first stage of use controlled use), but once practice and 
corrective feedback are supplied, it becomes rapid and automatic. This is 
further developed by Sharwood Smith when he talks of the knowledge control 
dimension (Sharwood Smith 1991:14).
Metalinguistic knowledge is referred to by Sharwood Smith, in his recent 
phase as 'explicit knowledge about language that is freely accessible to 
introspection’ (ibid: 1991:13). His view of metalinguistic knowledge is of 
uppermost importance to tins study, such is its similarity with the neurolinguistic 
view. He claims that, because metalinguistic knowledge involves conscious 
manipulation of knowledge, it approaches much more encyclopedic knowledge 
than linguistic knowledge, although it is certainly part of what we call 
LANGUAGE. Tims, metalinguistic knowledge is not acquired like linguistic 
knowledge (into the su b -m eta  or d e f a u lt  mode of processing, as it is known 
[ibid: 1993:171]), but follows the acquisition of encyclopedic knowledge, tins 
mode of processing being know  as the m eta -m o d e  (ibid). For that reason, 
that is, because they are two different kinds of knowledge, metalinguistic 
knowledge does not interfere in fluency, which depends solely on linguistic 
knowledge. Similarly to encyclopedic knowledge, metalinguistic knowledge 
improves to the extent that inductive learning improves, with cognitive 
maturation.
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LINGUISTIC MODULE 
£H Syntax 
H  Phonology 
f i  Morphology 
Lexlco-semantlcs□
OTHER MODULES
Auditory
Visual
Olfatory
Gustatory
Fig. 2 - B Starwood Smith's bilingual modular mental processing model 
(based on Fodor 1983)
Linguistic Module
CENTRAL PROCESSOR 
(general cognitive development)
gj| Lexico-semantics 
M  Morphology 
■  Pragmatics 
[J§| Meta-mode
other knowledge: history, math, world knowledge
Fig. 2 • A Sharwood Smith's bilingual modular mental processing model 
(based on Fodor1S83)
Central Processor
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In brief, linguistic knowledge, in the common sense of the word, consists of
I
two kinds of knowledge radically different from each other. They differ in nature 
(ie .5 source), and on the way they are acquired. They also differ on how they 
are retrieved, but this is beyond the topic in question.
Summing up Sharwood Smith's view of SLA, we can say that the first phase 
of this view tells us that input has a twofold aspect: looking for meaning and 
looking for form. This insight reveals two kinds of processing of linguistic 
input: acquisition and comprehension. While the focus of attention of the 
learner is on meaning, form is being abstracted subconsciously. Meaningful 
natural input is a necessary condition for SLA, but teaching may help if given at 
the right phase of the learning process. In sum, being exposed to meaningful 
input produces L2, but the process might be more effective if teaching is 
considered.
Another process proposed in his early view is analysis, a subconscious 
process that produces competence in the TL. In Sharwood Smith's view, 
analysis has a preponderant role in SLA. We may infer that analysis is part of the 
acquisition process, in Krashen's sense. He also agrees with Krashen in that the 
'conscious type of learning' does not help produce acquired knowledge or 
'spontaneous control of first or second languages’ (Rutherford & Sharwood 
Smith 1985:274). Tims, Sharwood Smith's ideas of the acquisition process can 
be said to be compatible with Krashen's in their fundamental assumptions.
Still in ins early phase, Sharwood Smith holds that instruction or C-R, as he 
calls it, may help to accelerate the acquisition process, if given under certain 
conditions, which are linked to Universal Grammar’s principles and 
parameters. Universal Grammar is not to be considered die only efficient and/or 
sufficient factor to determine the degree of C-R necessary, however, it is an 
important constant factor to be considered.
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The second phase of Sharwood Smith's work tells us quite detailedly and 
factually how acquired and learned knowledge, in Krashen’s sense, are 
represented in the learner's mind. It also tells us that metalinguistic knowledge 
does not lead to linguistic competence, since both do not emerge from the same 
source of knowledge.
It is interesting to observe how his view, emerging from theoretical 
linguistics, when influenced by recent work in psycholinguistics, reaches the 
point of being such a realistic proposal, that can be put side by side with the 
neurolinguistic view, without denying its linguistic bases. The constraints posed 
by UG, for instance, are present in the first view as a theoretical construct, but in 
tlie second, they become psychological entities, part of the innate 
ability/predisposition to acquire a language; similarly, language-specificity, a 
Chomskyan claim incorporated by Sharwood Smith, is part of both views, 
certainly giving rise to the concept of ’modularity’; but above all, the 
unconsciousness of the linguistic competence and of the processes that form it, an 
issue so much disputed, gains strength in this theory, reaching a psycholinguistic 
status.
There is only one explanation for that: there must be much truth about the 
acquisition process in theoretical linguistics.
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CHAPTERS
IN FO R M A T IO N -PR O C E SSIN G  THEORY
The clearest application of cognitive theoxy to second language acquisition is 
found in the work of McLaughlin. His work was first solely based on an 
information-processing theory (basically Siuffrin & Schneider 1977), but later it 
incorporated Rumelhart & Norman’s (1978) notion of restructuring, in order to 
account for the idiosyncrasies of the language acquisition process. The result is 
a conglomerate of insights from the most different areas related to psychology: 
information-processing, cognitive science, psycholinguistics, which is far from 
satisfactory in terms of explaining the acquisition of a second language, the 
ultimate goal of his research. It is so unsatisfactory that McLaughlin ends up 
recognizing its gaps and giving in to linguistic theories.
This chapter is divided into two main sections: the psychological 
underpinnings of the model and then application to SLA_ Finally, the 
consciousness issue is addressed, followed by some concluding remarks.
The psychological underpinnings:
1) Shiffrin & Schneider’s theory
Shiffrin & Schneider are responsible for what is perhaps the most 
comprehensive theory of human information-processing. Their theory
- a + i r A w c v n r f r a f 1 n t r t i  o f  / f a f a M i A f )  c v a r p a r v f n n t
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automatic attending (Schneider & Shiffrin 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider 1977), all 
of them involved in one way or another in the subject of learning.
We could say that learning, in their theory, is a matter of storing information 
in memory in an organized way. However, the process is more complex and 
specialized than that. We can start with the concept of memory proposed in their 
model. Memory is defined by Shiffrin & Schneider as 'a large and permanent
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collection of nodes, which become complexly and increasingly interassociated 
2nd interrelated through learning' (1977:155). These nodes, when in an inactive 
or passive state, are called long-term storage (LTS). When they are 
continuously active, they are called short-term storage (STS).
Despite the fact that in the information-processing area it is commonplace to 
find words such as node, I have objections to the use of the term node in a 
theory that is not neurologicallybased. First, because it lacks a precise definition, 
and, being akey-word in tins concept, it turns the concept into a loose, ilMefmed 
one. (McLaughlin has criticized his own the017 exactly for its imprecision of key- 
statements and definitions [see McLaughlin 1987:151]) So, what is a node? A 
schema? A network, a web of information? On page 155, Shiffrm & 
Sclmeider say that ’an individual node may consist of a complex set of 
information elements, including associative connections, programs for 
responses or actions, and directions for other types of information-processing’. 
Trás explanation might bring some clarification, although it does not minimize 
the inconsistent use of the term. Speaking of a set of information elements is 
something quite different from speaking of kinesthetic engrams, which is what 
programs for responses or actions actually are, and both are equalized in tins 
definition. Kinesthetic engrams are implicit mental representations for actions 
and responses neurologically feasible (Paradis, personal communication). So, 
memory is formed of interconnected associations of information, plus 
kinesthetic engrams, plus ’directions for other types of information-processing', 
which is also rather vague. I would say that this definition summarizes in a 
metaphor-like way the contents of the various types of memory, embracing 
them into a whole, rather vague, definition.
My second objection to the use of node relates to its more literal meaning, 
which embodies physical or physiological features (acc. to Webster, it's 'a 
thickened, swollen or differentiated area [as of a tissue]'), so that its use would
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be justified in a neurolinguistic but not in a psychological theory, since 
psychology does not deal with brain areas in a physiological sense.
Following the assumptions of the psychological underpinnings, Shiffrin & 
Schneider state that the function of STS is to keep information until it is stored 
permanently in LTS, and then discard it (forgetting). STS has a limited capacity 
for storage (Miller's [1954 cited in McLaughlin 1983] magic number: 7+2) and a 
limited time to keep information (some seconds). Beyond those limits, 
information in STS is either transferred to LTS or forgotten.
Learning is subject to two kinds of processes, which use STS and LTS. Being 
seen as transfer of information to LTS, learning involves a stage of controlled 
processes initially, until information processing becomes automatic. Thus, 
controlled processing is a requisite for storing in LTS.
A controlled process is a process that ’utilizes a temporary sequence of nodes 
activated under control of, and through attention by, the subject' (Shiffrin & 
Schneider 1977:156). Each activation requires the attention of the subject over 
again, so that the capacity of performance of controlled processes is limited 
due to selective attention.
An automatic process is a sequence of nodes that becomes active in 
response to input. This activation does not require conscious control or 
attention. For that reason, automatic processes are called capacity-free processes.
The transfer of information to LTS happens only under the requisite that the 
information being transferred pre-exists in STS. When transferred to LTS, new 
associations of information structures (nodes) are formed, associations that 
were not there before. 'Transfer1, therefore, does not simply mean changing 
information of place, fiorn STS to LTS, but modifying it. Willi consistent 
training (and only with that), these controlled processes become automatic, 
and thus much faster, working in an unconscious manner. A crucial claim in this 
theory, whose implications are relevant to this study, is that 'what is stored is
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wiiat is attended to and given controlled processing’, or ’some degree of 
attention or controlled processing is a prerequisite for storage' (1977:157). By 
implication, there is no implicit learning, in the general sense that is used in 
cognitive psychology and neurolinguistics, sense which is well put together in the 
words of Reber (1989:229-30):
[Implicit learning] is an unconscious process which yields abstract 
knowledge. It results from the induction of an abstract representation of the 
structure that the stimulus environment displays, and this knowledge is 
acquired in the absence of conscious, reflective strategies to learn. [...] 
Implicit learning produces a tacit knowledge base which is abstract -- such 
knowledge is optimally acquired independent of conscious efforts to learn.
To be fair with McLaughlin, we cannot omit that he talks of implicit learning, 
and so do Shiffrin & Schneider, but their view is definitely distinct from what is 
currently known as implicit learning, as defined above by Reber. McLaughlin 
(McLaughlin, Rossman & McLeod 1983:142) is rather unclear and extremely 
vague when he says that attention to formal properties of language does not 
have to be focal all the time, it might be peripheral: this takes place in what he 
calls implicit learning, which is defined as the ’relatively passive 
apprehension of linguistic structure’, and in the case of analogic learning, 
which is nothing but inductive learning. Moreover, some tasks where attention 
is taken to be peripheral are considered controlled in his view, which is not 
the case. As we will see in the neurolinguistic chapter, implicit learning, 
produces a type of knowledge which is automatic. In fact, McLaughlin 
misinterprets the concept of implicit learning, even though he does have a 
place for true implicit learning: it is when he speaks of 'performance in 
communication situations’ (ibid: 143), where the subject focuses attention on 
what is being said and not on how. In such situations, information processing 
does not involve attention to formal properties of language: thus, it is automatic.
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An example of a situation of this kind, according to McLaughlin, is overhearing 
a conversation in the target language.
Shiffiin & Schneider also talk of incidental learning in a misconceived way, 
in my view. For them, it is a synonym for implicit learning. Incidental or 
implicit leaning is when no extended rehearsal takes place, but indeed some 
learning occurs, since the input items are 'attended to during presenlation, 
(1977:158). In any case, the fact is that for these authors, and I would say for 
cognitive theories in general, there is no such tiling as acquisition of knowledge 
without attention. Tins is a serious flaw in these theories, since, as we will see 
in the neurolinguistic view', there is evidence of a type of memory in which 
what is stored is NOT what is attended to, but something else. Tins is known as 
procedural competence or implicit memory.
2) R um elhart & N orm an’s ’R estructu ring ’
Although McLaughlin theoretical bases on the restructuring issue are both 
Cheng (1985) and Rumelhart & Norman (1978), Cheng's position constitutes 
much more a critique of the information-processing theory and a call for a 
restructuring approach rather than a theory of how the restructuring process 
takes place in the mind. Thus, in the following lines, I ’Rill develop Rumelhart & 
Norman's view.
The very origin of the concept of restructuring is Piaget's notion of 'structural 
changes' that happen in the cognitive system, as it undergoes maturation 
(McLaughlin 1990:117). However, more recently, restructuring has taken on 
different connotations depending on the area in winch it is used. Within 
developmental psychology, for instance, it means a ’snapshot’ or clicks of 
sudden understanding, where everything learned so far seems to go to its right 
place.
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The notion of restructuring developed by RumeDiait and Norman (1978) 
derives from cognitive psychology. It was developed to explain the acquisition, of 
semantic knowledge in memory.
Riimelliait & Norman (1978), in then approach to learning, distinguish 
three modes of learning: accretion, tuning and restructuring. Accretion is the 
simple adding of information to one’s existing data-base (or perhaps we had 
better call this cognitive structure, following Ansubel), without modifying the 
organization already present. It occurs through exposure to the concepts. We can 
compare this type of learning to the acquisition of explicit knowledge, both 
encyclopedic and episodic. Tuning is the modification or evolution of already 
existent memory structures (which are also called knowledge structures or 
schemata) into new ones. Schemata are tuned in order to improve their 
accuracy, generalize or specialize their applicability, or determine a value of the 
schema that was not specified. Finally, restructuring is the creation of entirely 
new memory structures. It is really rearranging knowledge that has been already 
acquired in the light of new knowledge, thus creating new schemata, more 
adequate or closer to reality. It generally happens when the present 
organization of knowledge does not make sense anymore to new incoming 
information and a new organization is required to integrate the two sets of 
knowledge.
The psychological view applied to language learning
Cognitive Psychology sees language as a complex cognitive skill like any 
oilier, and language learning, like the learning of any other skills, following 
therefore the same principles of general learning. Based on that view, 
McLaughlin's model assumes that any complex task undergoes a continuum that 
ranges from higher to lower skills or from higher tasks to sub-tasks. Subtasks 
have to become automatized in order for higher tasks to take place.
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McLaughlin states that speech is an example of a such continuum of skills. It 
goes from the microgenesis of the utterance up to its acoustic realization. The 
high order task is the intent to communicate. In order for it to be achieved, sub­
tasks have to be realized, like morphosyntactic choice, lexical access, 
phonological realization. However, it is clear that this is a case of language 
processing.
I argue that the autoniatic-control continuum can only account for language 
processing or access to language. It cannot be used as an explanation of second 
language acquisition, because it is an instance of language use, rather than 
acquisition.
If such a continuum does not apply to language acquisition, to what extent, 
then, is McLaughlin's work psychologically- influenced?
It is already known that the SLA. process is not a continuous one, it shows 
certain discontinuities, i.e., some forms that appear to have been acquired 
eventually regress to a previous stage of acquisition. Some forms that have 
been extensively practiced (so that one would say that they should have become 
automatic) remain unlearned or pass through a period of backsliding. In the 
acquisition of the English past tense of irregular verbs, for example, learners 
produce the correct verb forms at a certain stage, but subsequently they 
regularize these forms (like goed. corned), and then the correct forms reappear. 
Regularization is a stage of acquisition of the past; in which all forms, regular 
and irregular, are regularized, since regularization is still non-systematic. In fact, 
systematic and non-systematic variability are terms devised by Ellis (1985) in Ins 
description of interlanguage. Ellis noticed that in the early stages of acquisition 
of a second language there is free-variation or non-systematic variability. When 
new forms enter, they cause a restructuring of the whole system until fomi- 
function correspondence is achieved, that is, each form is given a function, a 
meaning. This is the stage of systematic variability7, which takes place until all
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forms are used correctly. This type of evidence shows that learners leam not 
only from practice, but that their learning also depends on cognitive maturation. 
1 also shows that SLA is a process sui generis, peculiar to language. Such 
thinking gave rise to the famous concept of 'interlanguage' and its not less 
famous U-shaped curve. A full description of interlanguage is provided by 
Larsen-Freeman and Long (1991).
It is exactly this kind of evidence, the so called interlanguage evidence, that has 
intrigued McLaughlin. Realizing that the automalic-control continuum did not 
account for this type of data, which McLaughlin (1990:116) calls 'puzzling data', 
he found an explanation in the notion of 'restructuring', a mode of learning 
developed by Rumelhart &. Norman (1978) and Cheng (1985), among others, 
as explained in the 'Psychological underpinnings' section.
It is worth considering how the notion of restructuring applies to SLA.
According to Karmilloff-Smith (1986 cited in McLaughlin 1987:144), the 
restructuring process has at least three phases:
1 Automaiiciiy phase, also called bottom-up or data-driven. In this phase there 
is no preoccupation with organization of data provided by input. Once the 
procedures in this phase become automatized, learners can go to a 
'metaprocedural level', which is phase 2.
2 Phase of organisation-oriented procedures, the learner tries to simplify, 
unify, gain control over the internal representations. Tins phase is also called 
top-down phase, it is the phase of restructuring per se.
3 Integration of the bottom-up processes of phase 1 and the top-down 
processes of phase 2, At this phase external feedback can be considered without 
harm to the cognitive structure organization.
McLaughlin makes a claim for restructuring in syntax, learner strategies, 
semantics and reading. Restructuring in these areas is taken to be evidence of the
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restructuring process in second language learning. Now, I will explain, briefly 
each type of restructuring.
Restructuring in syntax can be found in the work of Pienemann, Meisel & 
colleagues (see Pienemann’s chapter), who researched the acquisition of syntax 
by Spanish and Italian immigrants learning German.
In order to explain restructuring in learning strategies, McLaughlin 
(1990:123) takes Ellis’ (1985) definition and categorization of learning strategies. 
Note that Ellis' use of the term strategies does not imply any level of 
consciousness, it might be considered a synonym for processes.
Initial learning strategies are simplification strategies (overgeneralization and 
transfer). In this stage, the learner is involved in building an internal 
representational system, which is simpler than the input and based on first 
language and on universal principles. Later on, learning strategies change to 
inferencing and hypothesis-testing. It is these two strategies that govern 
restructuring, according to McLaughlin (1990:123). They are basically related to 
rule analysis, inferencing is coming to the rules and hypothesis-testing is testing 
them.
Another evidence of restructuring related to learning strategies lies in the 
study of 'novice-expert shifts’ (McLaughlin 1990:123). ’Novice-expert shifts’ are 
the changes that take place as the beginning learner becomes expert in a certain 
area in which s/he is learning or acquiring knowledge. Studies show that there is 
difference between the schemata of beginners and more advanced learners. The 
last ones restructure schemata in such a way that what results is abstract 
schemata. Beginners, on the other hand, do not do this. They have concrete 
representations. Other studies reported in McLaughlin (1990) that analyze 
learning strategies specific to language, and which use artificial grammars show 
that the difference between multilinguals and monolinguals or bilinguals is in 
terms of flexibility in switching strategies, strategies of the kind of: mnemonic
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strategies, linguistic strategies, and oiliers. Besides, multilinguals have shown 
greater flexibility in restructuring their mental representations of the linguistic 
system. In sum, they have improved their capacities for controlling strategies and 
representations. This might be due to the use of metacognitive strategies or 
learning to learn', winch is a characteristic of the multilingual person.
The evidence for semantic restructuring is also controversial, perhaps the 
most controversial one. Semantic development in a second language, according 
to Ijaz (1986 cited in McLaughlinl990:122), consists of mapping two lexical 
and conceptual systems onto each other. The learner supposedly restructures 
existing first language concepts to develop new concepts that correspond to the 
SL lexical items. If not mistaken, such affirmation is at least inaccurate, specially 
when seen in the light of neurolinguistic studies. The subset hypothesis, held 
by Paradis (see neurolinguistic chapter), argues that we have a general cognitive 
store, where all the concepts or menial representations are stored, and 
store(s) for as many languages as there are. These stores, one for each 
language, comprise the language phonology, morphology, syntax and semantic 
constraints on the lexicon. The mental representations of Hie cognitive store are 
constrained by language-specific semantic constraints. The ’creation' of a 
lexical item in Hie SL does not pass necessarily through the LI; it is the mental 
representation or concept in the conceptual store that is constrained by the SL 
constraints. Interference from LI obviously can occur in both compound and 
subordinate bilingualism. But it does not seem that restructuring takes place in 
the manner explained by McLaughlin. Restructuring does take place within the 
SL lexicon, as it does within LI, and interference may be the triggering stimulus 
for tins restructuring, but that is not the same as saying that SL meanings result 
from the restructuring of LI ones. In fact, the neurolinguistic view held in this 
dissertation presumes some kind of predetermined semantic constraints in the
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acquisition of the lexicon, which is responsible for this difference among both 
views.
Reading provides further evidence of restructuring presented by McLaughlin 
(McLeod &.McLaughlin 1986). It is the result of an experiment carried out by 
him and McLeod (ibid), in which errors in reading tasks of beginning and 
advanced ESL students were analyzed. Hie errors of the beginning students were 
found to be non-meaningfui, and due to students focusing on the graphic aspects 
of the text. Advanced students had fewer errors in reading and were more 
competent in decoding the text, but still decoded it, which is not really a good 
tactic to use in the reading process, since we already know that the competent 
reader does not just decodes the text, but makes optimum use of reading 
strategies, like prediction, for instance. Thus, McLaughlin's students had the 
linguistic competence necessary to leave the 'decoding' stage, which is a 
common initial stage in the reading in a second language process, and go to the 
stage of interacting with the text, but they did not do so. The explanation for tins 
behavior is that even advanced students had not reached the point of 
restructuring in their reading performance.
Besides restructuring, another possibility later found by McLaughlin as a 
way to explain the idiosyncrasies of interlanguage is to assume that some part of 
acquisition develops in a predictable way, as sequences that consist of 'routines 
that are already automatized when they emerge' (Sajavaara 1978 in 
McLaughlin 1987:149). Under tins assumption, two routes are implied:
1) a route determined by linguistic constraints, which is predetermined and 
automatic when of its emergence; and
2) a route which is not predetermined, that goes from controlled to automatic 
processing. Tins route needs to be 'routinized'.
It seems that this possibility' of pre-automatized routines proposed by 
Sajavaara would be plausible if it were assumed that each route is the result of
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a different process; one is the source of implicit memory and as such is 
acquired incidentally, stored implicitly, not open to introspection, and so on 
(see the neurolinguistic chapter); and the other is the source of explicit memory. 
However, this is not the case in this theory -  McLaughlin does not accept 
incidental or implicit acquisition in the sense that the subject is not aware of 
what s/he is acquiring. How then, are such automatic, predetermined sequences 
supposed to be acquired? Tins part of his theory really leaves many crucial 
questions unanswered.
Practice or rote learning ?
The acquisition of a cognitive skill results from the automatization of 
routines. These routines require attention and 'mental effort' in the beginning, 
that is why the process is said to be controlled. But through practice, or 
'routinization', the process becomes automatic; that also means that it 
becomes effective, rapid, and that it is used unconsciously.
The main requisite for a complex cognitive skill to be learnt is repetition 
or practice. As McLaughlin (1990:115) puts it,
Repetitio est mater studiorum — practice, repetition, time on task — these
seemed to be the critical variables for successful acquisition of complex
skills, including complex cognitive skills such as second language learning.
It is amazing that McLaughlin does not seem to give importance to the 
motivation involved in practice, that is, the inner drive of the learner to say 
something. The motivation involved in learning is not accounted for, or, in 
neurolinguistic terms, there is no involvement of the lymbic system, no need for 
meaningful learning, in Ausubel’s words. As will be shown in the 
neurolinguistic chapter, Paradis points out that the lack of involvement of the 
lymbic system produces a kind of learning that does not lead to linguistic 
competence. Linguistic competence is acquired in the presence of this Inner
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drive to communicate. When this inner drive is present, it turns the attention 
to what is being said and away from how it is being said. This is how linguistic 
competence is acquired.
To me, this is a serious weakness of McLaughlin's theory; if we take it to the 
last consequences, this means that rote learning can take place and rote learning 
is at most behavioral in essence. It is a limited kind of learning. Tins type of 
theory, as put by Cook, 'reminds us that language is also behavior and skill' 
(1993:124). What he forgets, along with McLaughlin, is that recent research 
emphasizes exactly the opposite, namely, that language is not mainly behavior, 
but much more than that, it is a very special type of knowledge that develops in 
a unique way, that is acquired implicitly (in the absence of conscious efforts to 
learn), that is creative, and that has self-generating power, known as linguistic 
competence. Not surprisingly, McLaughlin's view is known to hold the 'non- 
uniqueness' position, that claims that there are not language faculties, but all 
knowledge, including linguistic knowledge, springs from a general cognition.
The consciousness issue
It is common to find the notion of controlled processes associated with the 
feature [+ conscious] and the notion of automatic processes associated with the 
feature [- conscious]. McLaughlin (1987) points out that according to Shiffrin
& Schneider, both controlled and automatic processes can in principle be 
conscious or not. The non-conscious controlled processes are known as 
'veiled', and these are those that occur so rapidly that they are unnoticed by the 
subject. Hie opposite of 'veiled processes' are the 'accessible' ones. As for 
automatic processes, they are omitted. In principle, they are always unconscious 
(because of their speed and because they must operate in parallel), so that the 
conscious/unconscious distinction does work in this case, despite McLaughlin's 
claim that consciousness is not a good criteria to distinguish one from the other.
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III sum, the acquisition of a second language can be seen ai least in two ways. 
One way to look at. it is as a predetermined process that needs to be triggered 
by input and by a strong desire to communicate in the target language. This 
process does not imply an intense 'mental effort', because what is acquired is 
scarcely perceived and definitely not rehearsed; at best, practiced within a 
relevant context. Any ’mental effort' is concentrated on the message to get across 
iit the target language. In this view, the linguistic system is abstracted from input, 
rather than effort fully built on the basis of rehearsal.
Another way of looking at it is as a constructive process, in the very sense of 
Piaget (and McLaughlin's theory does have a constructivist rationale), where 
the cognitive structure is built via interaction with the environment. As a result, 
the grammar of the language is organized (organization being the trigger for 
development in this view) by storing information in memory ai the expense of 
rehearsal.
In tins second viewr, memory is seen as a set of nodes, which are elements of 
information. Learning is making complex interconnections among the nodes. 
Long-term storage is said to be a state in which nodes are passive. When they 
become active, they are called short-term, storage. Two processes are said to 
participate in the interconnection of nodes: controlled and automatic processes. 
Controlled processes require attention, therefore, they are limited, since the 
focus of our attention is selective. They also demand more energy to be 
processed, probably because they are conscious. Automatic processes, in turn, 
demand less energy, are very effective and do not require attention to be 
performed Several automatic processes can occur at the same time, which we 
call 'parallel processing'. McLaughlin (1990:125) says that the automaticity 
process is 'essentially learning through accretion' or adding to the cognitive 
structure, in other words. Other changes in the cognitive structure take place 
through restructuring. As to practice, in his view, it may have two purposes: 1
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improve performance, by automatizing sub-skills, 2 lead to restructuring in 
performance, by the reorganization of the cognitive structure. The effects of 
practice do not lead to immediate skilled action but cumulate as learners develop 
more efficient procedures.
A. question that remains, or perhaps emerges from a model like 
McLaughlin's, that does not presume any pre-existent linguistic knowledge in 
the learner's mind, is. why some things are attended to and stored at the expense 
of others?
We know that some tilings are attended to and subsequently stored, and 
others are not. But we do not know why restructuring takes place with some 
information and not with others. What causes restructuring? What determines 
which linguistic information undergoes restructuring and which undergoes 
storage in an information-processing mode?
Being a cognitive psychologist, McLaughlin says that it is the drive for 
organization that governs human experience that triggers restructuring. This 
claim is a constructivist one, i.e., based on the findings of Piaget, who assumes 
that all human experience is organized and it is tins drive for organization that 
leads to cognitive development. What we arrive at here is the famous debate 
between constructivism and innaiism. It remains unclear whether they are 
opposite sides or complementary to each other (cf. Piatelli-Palmarini 1980.XTV).
To what extent can McLaughlin's model be said to be an 
acquisitional/learning model if it does not speculate about the causes of 
learning? Nor about WHAT is acquired, that is, the competence system or 
whatever that is the resulting object of acquisition?
The fact is that McLaughlin's model is very limited, basically because 
cognitive psychology has been unable to explain important linguistic data 
emerging from language acquisition. I would say that his model at best explains 
second language use and part of the acquisition of declarative knowledge, but
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even so, it lacks development in issues as attention, for example, which is not 
explained despite its crucial role in tlte tlieory. We must, however, give to 
McLaughlin credit for recognizing the weaknesses of his model. His remarks 
towards that are:
Note Shat cognitive psychologists see the same principles applying to complex 
skills such as reading, writing, or learning a second language as apply in the 
case of motor skills such as driving, typing, or playing tennis. (McLaughlin 
1990:115)
Such a cognitive psychological description of second language learning 
provides, non the less, a partial account, and needs to be linked to linguistic 
theories of second language acquisition. By itself, for example, the cognitive 
perspective cannot explain such linguistic constraints as are implied in 
markedness tlieory or that may result from linguistic universais. These 
specifically linguistic considerations are not addressed by an approach that 
sees learning a second language in terms of the acquisition of a complex 
cognitive skill, (ibid: 126)
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CHAPTER 9
CLASSIFYING SLA THEORIES
After reviewing a number of psychoiinguistic theories and finding the 
domain of cognitive processes quite non-consensual and controversial, it was a 
natural drive to look for similarities and distinctions among tlieories studied.
T i n i r  n  a w z w r t a / i  f r A * > i  f U f l  T f  a  K a  « * v A i* f
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relevant throughout the theories: the areas which constituted their source of 
influence, or the areas from which they borrowed their theoretical constructs. 
In my opinion, recognizing the grounds of psychoiinguistic theories of SLA 
clarifies the whole domain of cognitive processes.
Hie classification I propose somehow summarizes the study of tlieories 
examined in this dissertation up to now by separating them into two groups: 
linguistically-influenced tlieories and psychologically-influenced tlieories. In 
this sense, tins chapter is conclusive in nature.
By the time tins classification was being organized, other classifications 
appeared in Hie literature, showing the convergence of research towards a 
clarification to the picture of SLA tlieories. Therefore, before presenting my 
proposal, I will briefly present the different classifications that emerged, 
avoiding lengthy descriptions of tlieories involved in the classifications, 
even the ones that were not described in the previous chapters. Comprehensive 
descriptions of such tlieories can be found in the respective references.
Still before presenting the classifications, I would like to elaborate on the 
controversy that permeates SLA tlieories as far as the psychoiinguistic 
processes are concerned. I will try to elucidate what I consider to be the 
main controversial aspects and their causes.
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The controversy
A central source of controversy, pointed out by McLaughlin (1990a), is the 
use of abstract, subjective issues such as consciousness as constructs for 
theories. Because it is very difficult to precise which mental states are conscious 
and which are unconscious, which makes such notions unspecific and 
untestable, this type of construct should be avoided in theories. I disagree 
partially, for I think that while such notions cannot be avoided in 
psychologically-related theories, the meaning they take in a certain theory 
should be at least clearly stated to avoid ambiguities.
A second source of controversy I found is that some researchers (Larsen- 
Freeman 1991) argue that SLA theories are explanations rather than 
descriptions of the SLA As such, they can encompass all kinds of hypotheses.
and assumptions, because assumptions do not require support, while claims,
/
which are the ultimate result of descriptions, do. The result is the vagueness of 
concepts that underlie the theories, not to mention the vagueness of Hie 
theories themselves.
A third source of controversy .within SLA theories is the fact that SLA is a 
multi-disciplinary area. This fact raises problems with methodology, 
backgrounds and interests, and terminology, among others, as shown below.
Because SLA is a new autonomous discipline (Larsen-Freeman & Long 
1991:12-5), it lias not established its own methods of research, drawing still 
from methods used in education and first language acquisition. Take, for 
instance, the controversy involving introspective methods, a traditional 
psychological methodology that still faces severe resistance from linguists.
The other problem risen by multi-disciplinarity, this time pointed out by 
Snow (in press), refers to the different background and training of SLA 
researchers and thinkers, besides their different interests, which produce
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separate groups of researchers/lines of research unable to converge into a 
consensual view.
The terminological problem is perhaps the most serious problem deriving 
from a mute-disciplinary enterprise and deserves a more careful consideration. 
Despite flie fact that a large number of terms used in SLA have counterparts in 
the contributing areas, each source-area prefers its own terminology, 
making it impossible to reach a consensus.
Even the term psycholinguistics can be pointed out as causing much 
controversy. I can point out at least three meanings of this word at the present 
time.
The first one refers to the linguistic tasks of production and comprehension 
(or reception). Cook (1993.267) calls such tasks speech production; Sharwood 
Smith (1991:12) refers to them as on-line processing, on-line control, and 
Mowledge processing; and Bialystok (1990b: 116), who lias a whole theory 
about it, calls them language processing, which I consider the best option; 
Chomsky (1980:201-2) has called these tasks production and interpretation 
processes.
The second definition is related to the linguistic subdiscipline upon which a 
theory is based. Tins meaning refers to a second connotation the term takes on 
in Applied Linguistics: ’it is the study of (a) the mental processes that a person 
uses in producing and understanding language, and (b) how humans learn 
language’ (Richards, Platt & Weber 1985:234). Hence, it is a synonym for 
cognition involving language. This is the meaning taken in this dissertation, for I 
believe that it describes what the theories attempt to do: explain the mental 
processes involved in the learning of language. Bialystok (1990a:636) says that 
distinguishing among theories according to their linguistic subdiscipline ’is 
rattier effective ... as it clarifies the ways in which the theories are different while 
legitimizing each as a valid description of SLA'.
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The third meaning of tiiis word is a synonym for information-processing 
theories of language, tliose which emerge from cognitive psychology and which 
focus on performance rather than competence.
In his 1986 article, Sharwood Smith points out the huge misunderstanding 
that surrounds Hie term psycholinguistics — and its consequences, sometimes 
serious ones, such as the expectation on tire part of certain researchers that the 
Chomskyan notion of derivational complexity has to have psychological 
reality. He reminds us that Chomsky never claimed that derivational 
mechanisms are real mental processes, or that the notions of competence and 
performance are more than abstract conceptualizations, and indeed there is no 
reason, he says, why such a theory cannot be considered psychological, as 
other theories that attempt to describe 'observable behavior".
It is within this perspective that Sharwood Smith (1986) mentions several 
areas which are generally considered to belong, to Psycholinguistics, which offers 
us a hint of how polemical the term is, namely, Psycholog}', Linguistics , 
Theoretical Psycholinguistics. Among other tilings, he concludes that 'Chomsky's 
territorial claim ... is to theoretical psycholinguistics'.
I fully agree with him, since Chomsky’s theory is not restricted to 
describing the linguistic system (although he is certainly known for doing so), 
but he also explains how tins linguistic system is acquired, the 
psycholinguists variables involved, such as the LAD, Hie powerful Universal 
Grammar and the notion of 'cognizing', a unique process for developing 
linguistic competence.
The fact that Chomsky's work is theoretical rather than experimental has to do 
with its reliance on a hypothetical-deductive type of method, which uses a 
rationalistic approach instead of an empirical one so as to explain rather than 
describe a particular aspect of human behavior (see Scliar-Cabral 1991:20-1 for 
further discussion).
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Although traditionally linguistics was concerned with tlie study of 
competence, whereas psychology, and later psycholinguistics should take 
care of performance, Chomsky (1980:201-2) did not agree with such a 
division:
Thus, linguistics is taken to be the field that relies on informant judgments, 
elicited material, whatever limited use can be made of an actual corpus, and 
so on, to try to determine the nature of grammar and UG. Its concern is 
competence. Psychology, in contrast, is concerned with performance, not 
competence; its concern is the processes of production, interpretation and the 
like, which make use of the knowledge attained and the processes by which 
transition takes place from the initial to the final state, that is, language 
acquisition. To me, this distinction has always seemed quite senseless.
The very claim that linguistics is not to be considered a ’behavioral 
science’, but a 'science of the mind’ (Chomsky 1972:65) was sufficient to 
trigger a debate. As McLaughlin (1990b: 113) points out, the issue here is that 
evidence (behavioral evidence) studied should not be confused with the goal 
o f the study. So, Chomsky studies behavior in order to understand the 
human mind. That is the reason why he considers Linguistics a subarea of 
Cognitive Psychology (ibid:2S,S8). There lies one source of the wrhole debate 
around the real object of study of psycholinguistics.
Having finished this discussion on the conflicting aspects involving SL 
theories, I now turn to the different SLA classifications quoted in the 
literature, as well as my own. They are: McLaughlin's (1990a), Larsen- 
Freeman's (1991), Bialystok's (1990a) and Snow's (in press).
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The classifications
In his article, McLaughlin (1990a) discusses the face validity of theories 
which rely on the conscious/unconscious distinction. Despite the fact that he 
does not attempt to categorize theories in the conventional sense, he does so 
through analysis of different debates among several authors:
1 The Krashen (1979)/McLaughlin (1978) debate, which refers basically to the 
acquisition/learning dichotomy;
2 The Reber (1976)/Dulany (1984) debate, which relies on the notion of 
implicit versus explicit learning;
3 The McClelland, Rumelliart (1986)/Pinker, Prince (1988) debate, which is 
a connectionist debate, and as such deals with the enigma of whether language 
consists of a network of input-generated units which are strengthened or 
weakened through parallel processing, or whether it consists of mental 
representations of rules.
The debates can be summarized in the following chart:
Krashen/McLaugMin
k
Reber/Dulany McClelland,RumeIhart/ 
Pinker* Prince
j— acquisition xleam ing
_automatic x  controlled
processing
-implicit learning 
-explicit learning
«— Connectionism
unconscious mental 
rules
Fig. 1 McLaughlin's debates
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Larsen-Freeman (1991) classifies theories as nativist, behaviorist or 
environmentalist, and interactionist. Nativist theories are those in which 
learning depends upon a significant, specialized innate capacity for language 
acquisition' (ibid.323). They are best exemplified by Chomsky's theory of 
Universal Grammar, which gave rise to many SLA studies (White 1988, Felix 
1985). The objective of these theories is the description of competence or 
grammatical knowledge. Behaviorist or environmentalist theories are those in 
which '(lie learner’s experience is more important than innate capacity 
(ibid:323). This division includes Connectionist/Parallel Distributed Processing 
(PDP) models, which do not presuppose any innate ability for the acquisition 
of languages. Finally, interactionist theories refer to those in which "both 
internal and external processes are responsible [for SLA]’ (ibid). Interactionists 
or variationists tend to explain liow knowledge gets realized as use’. It is 
represented by Ellis’ (1985) Variable Competence Model. This model is based 
on Tarone's (1979, 1983) ’Capability Continuum Paradigm'. Linguistic 
knowledge is described by way of a continuum of speech styles, which ranges 
from the careful style to the vernacular. The linguistic knowledge (and thus 
the styles) is accessed according to the pragmatic context. Ellis goes further in his 
model, assuming that what enhances learning is free variation.
Larsen-Freeman’s classification is sketched in the following chart:
Nativist Behaviorist o r 
Environmentalist
Interactionist 
o r  \^riatiosist
Chomsky’s UG 
appEed to  SLA 
(W ife, Felix)
Connectionism/PDP
(Rumelhart,McCleUaad 
& PDP Research Group)
Variable Competence 
Model 
(Ellis based on  Tarone)
Fig. 2 Larsen-Freeman's classification
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In her article, Bialystok (1990a) makes objections to a previous 
classification of SLA theories used by Spolsky (1989), originally proposed by 
Chomsky (1965), which divides theories into competence and processing 
theories. Bialystok not only objects to Spolsky's typology, but she also re­
classifies the theories, based on the assumption that theories usually classified 
as competence theories do not fulfill the criteria posed by Chomsky to describe 
a competence theory: knowledge as mental structures and idealization of 
operation of the competence system. In this way, the iiiformation-processmg 
theories, known by Spolsky as processing theories, are actually competence 
theories, because they emphasize the structure of the system and not its use. On 
the other hand, the variability theories, known as competence theories are in fact 
processing theories, because they explain access to use language, or, in other 
words, learning is described proceduraDy. According to Bialystok, a processing 
theory must be ’neutral, regarding the structure of the mental representations that 
underlie performance’, and they must be ’descriptions that apply over a limited 
and specific point in time’ (ibid:645-6).
Competence theories can be exemplified by theories derived from Chomsky. 
Another example is Jackendoffs (1987) theory, also known as the Preference 
Model. In fact, what is explained by Jackendoff is a process, but his theory is 
classified as a competence theory because, according to Bialystok (1990a;645), it 
is ’an idealization of how knowledge stored in certain kinds of mental 
structures’ works.
Processing theories are, for example, Tarone’s (1988) model and 
Connectionist models (Rumelhart & McClelland 1986) because these models 
explain the learning process and cognition without assuming a rule system. 
Althoughthe Connectionist models propose rule-like behavior, there is no such 
thing as a ’competence' system.
Figure 3 showrs Bialystok's classification:
Competence Processing
Information-processing models 
(Jackendoff)
PDP/Connectionist models 
(Rumelhart, McClelland; Tarone)
Fig. 3 Bialystok's classification
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Finally, Snow's (in press) categorization of theorists includes five major
groups, the first one related to second language pedagogy and focusing on
i
product rather than on process, and the last one a sociolinguistic division. These 
two groups are not of interest to this paper. The other three, which involve 
cognitive theories of SLA, are the following:
1 Child language researchers who believe that second language acquisition 
is similar to first language acquisition in many ways. This group refers to 
developmental psychologists. Topics researched by this group are, for 
instance, whether SLA resembles first language acquisition, and in what ways it 
does so (Ervin-Tripp 1974); and the effect of the environment on the 
development of SLA (Snow 1990).
2 Linguists interested in Universal Grammar applied to SLA Theories that 
have a Chomskyan influence belong to this group. These theories are also . 
called competence theories by Snow, and they focus on rules. The most classic 
example is White 1990, who argues that UG operates powerfully in SLA by 
shaping and restricting the second language.
3 Psycholinguists interested in language processing issues, who see language 
learning as a type of information-processing. These models focus on 
performance in opposition to competence, and on strategies in opposition to 
rules. McLaughlin's (McLaughlin, Rossman & McLeod 1983) infomiaiion- 
processing perspective (also called Cognitive theory) belongs to this division, as 
well as MacWhinney’s (1987) Competition model applied to SL research. This 
model has to do with processing tendencies that are transferred from the LI to 
the SL. Sentence interpretation is one of these tendencies. According to the 
model, sentence interpretation 'is governed by accumulated knowledge of the 
likelihood that certain cues indicate certain semantic roles'. The processing of 
sentence interpretation is conveyed to the SL, but if the SL does not follow the 
same kind of processing, the transfer can impede rather than enhance the 
learning process.
95
Avoiding to Snow (personal communication), most theories and models 
have characteristics of different groups, or at least of more than a group, in such 
a way that it is hard to exemplify a group by using an individual theory or 
author.
I have summarized Snow’s classification in Figure 4:
Child language researchers 
(Developmental psychologists)
lingu ists Psycholinguists
L2 -  LI theories 
(Ervin-Tiipp; Snow)
Chomsky’s  UG 
applied to SLA 
theories or 
competence 
theories 
(W hite)
SL information- 
processing 
theories 
(MacWhinney; 
McLaughlin et al.)
Fig. 4 Snow’s classification
The proposed classification
I propose a classification of theories which considers the central feature of a 
psycholinguistic theory of second language the source areas in which they 
are rooted. The proposed classification is divided into models or theories that 
have a linguistic influence and those which have a psychological influence as 
they try to explain the SLA process. Since all of them, in my view, could be 
considered psycholiiiguistic theories, the term had to be avoided in this 
classification so as to prevent misunderstandings.
The fundamental issue that underlies the theories is the relation among 
grammar, the language processing system and the general cognitive system. 
There are two opposing views concerning this issue.
The mentalist view'of language (based on Chomsky 1972, 1980 andFodor 
1983) holds that language is, or is part of, a specific mental sub-system with its 
own idiosyncratic structure and design (the language faculty); it. is one of a
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system of interacting modules which make up Hie mind, each of which lias its 
own particular properties, and each of which may itself comprise distinct though 
interacting components’ (Carston 1988:39). This view postulates that the mind 
develops as a modular structure with specific capacities in their own way. ’The 
mind is modular, i.e., with the LAD as but one of various ’mental organs’ that 
interact with each other and with the input to produce linguistic competence’ 
(Chomsky 1980). In this mentalist view, language has its own principles, which 
are defined independently of other cognitive systems. In this view, also, 
grammars produced by linguists are taken to be ’real mental entities’.
This language system is innate and it has to be so. It would not be possible to 
have modularity without innateness because the mind must be innately 
programmed for these special faculties, or how would they develop?
The opposite view is called the language fallout view* or the ’instrumentalist 
view* by philosophers and developmental psychologists like Piaget, where it 
finds its roots. It posits that the structure of the language should be explained 
by the principles of general intelligence: ’the structure of the language 
would fall out as a consequence of the structure of the cognitive system itself 
(Tanenliaus, Carlson & Seidenberg 1985 cited in Carston 1988:40). For them, 
the mind develops as a whole. In tins view, grammars are just frameworks, not 
something real, not ’mental primitives'. The fallout view faces strong 
discontinuing evidence: the very complex knowledge of language that young 
children have.
The following topics, in fact, stem from this first fundamental issue just 
discussed. The first one is related to the nature and representation of the linguistic 
system in the mind. The second one is concerned with the acquisition of the 
linguistic system. The third one is related to metalinguistic knowledge.
While theories influenced by linguists propose that the acquisition process 
produces a ’competence system', which is language-specific in essence, theories
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influenced by psychology propose the building up of a cognitive structure. 
Thus; what we call competence in a linguistic theory would have a counterpart 
in psychological theory -  the cognitive structure. This cognitive structure ( also 
called knowledge structure, semantic base, network of information, web of 
information, and so on) is a network of information systematically 
organized. Its description/organization varies from theory to theory among 
psychologically-influenced theories. Some theories, such as Ausubel's 
Assimilation theory, and also an earlier view of Rumelhart (RumeUiart & 
Norman 1978), argue that Hie cognitive structure is organized hierarchically, on 
the basis of hyponyms and co-hyponyms (see chapter 1). McLaughlin’s theory, 
although known as stemming from infonnation-processing, a psychological 
sub-area, fits in that line. He says that the information is encoded in two 
memory systems, short-term memory and long-term memory, and that the 
organization of this last one, where information is kept permanently, may be in 
terms of 'associative networks or hierarchical systems' (Anderson & Bower 1974 
cited in McLaughlin, Rossman & McLeod 1983:138). More recent 
contemporary theories claim that the mind is made up of millions of 
connections that are build up by the environment, that is, they are not innate.
The most important criticism that can be made to psychological theories 
is that they do not clearly delimit m their theories the three aspects posed by 
Cook (see Introduction), and do not recognize that they are not capable of 
describing Hie linguistic system and how this system is distinct from other 
cognitions In psychological theories, no reference is made to the description of 
grammar. Most of them actually explain language processing (aspect # 3 in 
Cook's description) and misconceive it as the description of the language system. 
Thus, as Cook (1993:267) says, language is a process in those theories in 
opposition to knowledge in linguistic theories. ’It is above all a grammar of
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processing rather than knowledge, of performance rather than competence. 
Consequently, answers the use question rather than the acquisition question'.
The second issue has to do with the acquisition of the linguistic system. The 
posed processes of acquisition differ radically and this constitutes another 
dissimilarity among the two trends of theories.
As to linguistic theories, Chomsky says that ’we cognize acquired knowledge 
as well as innate knowledge’ (Chomsky 1975 cited in Krashen 1982:102). Those 
that are influenced by Chomsky say that the process of acquisition is a process 
which is unconscious and relatively inaccessible to introspection (Sharwood 
Smith 1991:13). The process posed by linguistic theories resembles that of the 
first language, the so called ’creative construction’. The natural route/internal 
agenda is the route taken by this creative construction process.
Theories influenced by psychologists propose the building up of cognitive 
structure through assimilation of new knowledge to previous knowledge Tins 
kind of knowledge acquisition involves storing in short-term memory' and long 
term memory and demands attention and awareness at first, where it depends 
on controlled processes, and practice, so that these can become automatic 
processes. In fact, memory models are implied, and in memory models, short­
term memory is a synonym for attention or awareness. Such a mechanism is not 
language-specific in the sense that any kind of knowledge can be acquired in 
this way, including language knowledge. Thus, language has to be automatized as 
any other skill in order to be used fluently, since it is seen as an ability like any 
oilier, or sometimes as a kind of knowledge like any other. Cook (1993:266) 
summarizes tins, saying that in this type of theory learning is a process that 
goes from declarative, controlled, attended data to procedural, automatic, non­
attended processes. In the next chapter, we will see that tins is absolutely 
impossible in neurolinguistic model, since declarative and procedural
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knowledge are completely independent from each other, subserved by different
neural substrates (see glossary), and thus one cannot become the other.
Another difference as far as acquisition of the linguistic information is 
concerned is related to feedback. In psychological theories, it is crucial to 
have negative feedback for the formation of the knowledge structure. In 
linguistic theories, we know from Chomsky that feedback is irrelevant and 
actually does not occur in spontaneous acquisition. In formal acquisition it 
does, but as Cook (1993:263) says, ’[formal acquisition] is only one route to 
the L2 out of many and does not seem to apply to its most central aspects'.
The issue of metalinguistic knowledge also varies in each branch of the 
classification. As linguists believe in a very special, unconscious process for 
language acquisition, and in the inaccessibility of linguistic competence, that 
knowledge is not the same as metalinguistic knowledge, or knowledge about 
grammar, since it cannot be verbalized. Thus, metalinguistic knowledge must 
have as its source another ’faculty’, and as such it does not interfere in the 
acquisition of linguistic competence. That is known as the non-interface 
position (Krashen 1985:39), namely, that metalinguistic knowledge cannot be 
converted into purely linguistic knowledge and vice-versa.
One resulting feature of the metalinguistic issue is that the learning and the 
acquisition processes (in the Krashian sense) do not belong to the same 
paradigm. The acquisition process, as described by Krashen, is a notion 
influenced by linguistics, that produces fluency in the second language whereas 
Hie learning process resembles the acquisition of encyclopedic knowledge — it 
produces meta-knowledge, which does not enhance fluency but only serves as a 
monitor. That type of knowledge is known as ‘statable’ knowledge, that is, it 
can be verbalized through introspection.
Linguists see an essential contribution of the learner's cognition, besides 
acknowledging Hie necessary role of the linguistic environment to the learning 
process — input — and the need for the input to be adjusted to the level of the 
learner. Cognitive psychologists also recognize the significant contribution of 
learner’s cognition, but give much more importance to the linguistic environment 
than linguists, since it is the agent of transformation of experience into memory 
traces. For the linguist, there is not only innate ability to acquire language but
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also pre-existing knowledge about the language. Not for the psychologist. In 
this case, there is only innate ability. The tendency of psychologists to give ja 
crucial role to the environment is becoming more and more evident in 
contemporary trends of research, such as connectionism. It is so much so that 
some researchers consider such trends 'behaviorist’, arguing that in such 
theories, language comes from the outside — from input from others and from 
interaction -  rather than from inside the mind’ (Cook 1993:122).
The chart below shows the characteristics and the theories/models that 
belong to the proposed classification:
Linguistic Psychological
c Modular view Language fallout view
h UG/internal agenda Memory models
a 'Creative construction’ Automatic/controlled processes
r Attention
a
c I I “
t acquisition learning
e I i
r unconscious conscious
i 1 1
s competence cognitive
t 1 structure
i 1 i
f c  1 inaccesible access via
s fin principle’ introspection
t Chomsky Ausubel
h Krashen McLaughlin
e Pienemmann
0 Prabhu
r Seliger
I!!!!® !! Sharwood Smith
e
s
Fig. 5 The proposed classification
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What might seem to be a limitation of tliis classification is that 
psychologically-grounded theories analyzed were limited to McLaughlin’s, 
besides Ausubel's assimilation theory, which was cited much more as a 
seminal source of influence than as an influenced theory. Actually, there are 
not many psychological theories that attempt to explain the SLA process 
without being committed to language processing (following Cook's aspects, this 
is # 3), which is not really the issue under discussion here. If not for time and 
space limitations, it would be extremely interesting to analyze the acquisitional 
view implied in those theories, thus summing to Hie ones presented here. Some 
examples are the language processing model for SL (Bialystok 1990b, 1991a, 
1991b), former competence/control model (Bialystok 1978); Hie Preference 
Model (Jackendoff 1987); Hie Competition Model (Mac Whinney 1987), ACT 
(Anderson 1983).
Furthermore, there are the Connectiomst theories, the most recent trend of 
SLA theories, also resulting from information-processing research. Although 
they aim at describing acquisition of knowledge (aspect #2) as well as the 
representational level of language (aspect #1) and language processing (aspect 
#3), they were left out of this dissertation for reasons of space and 
complexity.
To some extent, characteristics of psychologically-influenced theories 
presented in this chapter apply to the processing theories of SLA cited 
above as well as to Hie connectionist Hieories. However, it must be pointed 
out Hiat connectionist Hieories represent a very radical move in SLA towards the 
Cognitive Sciences, explaining language knowledge and its acquisition by 
analogy with systems Hiat present intelligent behavior and are able to interact 
adaptively with their environments.
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111 this chapter I have attempted to elucidate the disputatious field of 
psycholinguistic theories of SLA by setting parameters as to what constitutes a 
linguistic theory and what constitutes a psychological theory. It was extremely 
supporting to discover, after arriving to such a classification by myself, that 
oilier researchers also share/arrived at the same end point of distinguishing 
linguistic theories from psychological ones. McLaughlin (1990b) and Cook 
(1993) can be cited as examples.
At Hie theoretical level, the level in which the models studied are inserted, the 
ideal model of SLA seems to be neither a language model nor a learning model, 
but a learning model applied to language, which accounts for the idiosyncrasies 
of the language acquisition process at the same time that it works in a manner 
similar to other types of cognition, because there are aspects in which cognitive 
and language development overlap, or one leads to the other. Though this 
classification provides a clear picture of cognitive theories of SLA, it is still 
limited to a theoretical or intuitional level of research. What may contribute to 
the further clarification of tins matter, showing us a more realistic picture of the 
process is neurolinguistic research, the content of my next chapter.
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CHAPTER 10
DRAWING FROM NEUROLINGUISTICS
In my perception, the claims about the process of SLA deriving from 
linguistic and psychological theories analyzed so far have been highly 
theoretical and speculative in character. A discipline which makes a more 
practical contribution is neurolinguistics. In fact, the neurosciences constitute 
presently a fertile research area exploring the cognitive processes involved in 
SLA_ The present chapter presents a neurolinguistic view on the assumption that 
it is essential to incorporate such findings in order to promote a comprehensive, 
realistic perspective of the language acquisition process.
Hie neurolinguistic view adopted in this dissertation will be Paradis' 
(1985,1987, 1993, in print), for reasons of recency, and for the quantitatively 
and qualitatively significant empirical evidence that gives support to his view. A 
crucial notion underlying this view is that of competence and performance, 
being, in this sense, influenced by Chomsky. According to Paradis (1985:30-1),
there are good empirical grounds for maintaining the distinction between 
the notion of competence, or the store of a person’s knowledge of his 
language, and performance, or the access to tins knowledge and its use in 
actual concrete situations.[...] Hence, there is no reason to reject the 
distinction between competence and performance, provided that one 
does not use a transformational generative model of competence, but one 
that is at the same level of abstraction that comprises it.
Hie level lie is speaking of, and that will be developed here, is the 
neurolinguistic one. The following topics are going to be addressed in tins 
chapter:
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The organization o f two languages in the brain
Neurofunctionai modularity o f the systems
Memory systems involved in the acquisition o f language
Implicit competence
Explicit knowledge
Evidence for implicit acquisition
Evidence for dissociation between declarative and procedural memory
Maturational constraints on memory systems
Language aspects belonging to procedural and declarative memory
Metalinguistic knowledge
The limbic system
T he organization of tw o languages in the brain
How are the. two languages of the bilingual stored and processed in the brain? 
Are they stored separately, each one as an independent linguistic system, or as a 
single linguistic system? In order to answer these questions, which actually refer 
to the notion of competence, several hypotheses have been proposed in the 
neurolinguistic literature (Paradis 1985:20-3), such as the extended system 
hypothesis, the dual system hypothesis, the tri-partite system hypothesis, the 
bilingual-type-dependent system hypothesis, and finally, the subset 
hypothesis, proposed by Paradis (ibid). Up to now, there is no clinical evidence 
that, there is only one neurolinguistic competence for both languages, that is, 
that both languages are subserved by the same neurophysiological substrate 
(see glossary). Further studies of differential recoveries (see glossary) are 
needed to show which hypothesis best explains the organization of the 
languages of the bilingual or the polyglot in the brain. However, presently, the 
subset hypothesis is the one which best accounts for all the observable data on 
differential recoveries.
The subset hypothesis holds that there is an isolable function known as 
language, which can be subdivided into as many languages as there are. In the 
case of the bilingual, there are two languages, each one with its phonology, 
morphology, syntax and semantic constraints on the lexicon. There is one subset 
for LI and another one for L2. But there is also the cognitive store, the level of
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mental representations, which is independent, and which is phylogeneficaUy 
prior.
Thus, Paradis maintains that we have linguistic subsystems within a general 
cognitive system, which is completely independent from, but interacts with 
language, because it is assumed that language encodes a pre-existing message 
there would be no language without a message to encode, but the message may 
not be encoded at all. Hie system looks like a succession of sets which are 
subdivided into smaller sets, and into smaller sets. He compares i£ to a 
Russian doll or to an onion. There is always a layer underneath, which is going 
to be a smaller part than the rest. Each part is necessary to the whole, but does 
have an independent existence (neurofunctional modularity, see below), 
because it can be selectively impaired, that is, we do not destroy the system by 
removing one module. If we remove the phonology, everything else is left. If we 
remove part of the syntax, the patient becomes agrammatic (see glossary), but 
the lexicon and the phonology remain.
Despite the fact that the language modules are represented separately, this 
representation does not imply that they are anatomically (physically) stored 
separately. They can very well be stored in integrated ways, that is, we can have 
a mixture of two language modules in the same general area. In fact, there are 
circuits which subserve one module and the other, or they may be the same 
circuits, but in different connections, because there is evidence that we can 
inhibit one connection while the other one is functioning, or vice-versa, as 
shown by the selective recoveries and other types of non-parallel recoveries (see 
glossary). Tins evidence shows that one language is separated from the other, 
since the patient can recover one language, but not the other. In this way, lesions 
at different areas will affect selectively one system or parts of each of the 
systems. Aphasia and dementia (see glossary) are evidence for the existence of
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each system. Different amnesias are evidence for the existence of parts within 
the systems. Both types of evidence will be explained further.
The organization of the systems in the unilingual is identical to that of the 
bilingual. The unilingual has two stores, the cognitive store and the language 
store, even though here there is only one language store. It is a question of 
quantity/degree, not a question of one having something that the other one does 
not have. In principle, anything that is true for the bilingual is true for the 
unilingual.
Neurofunctional modularity of the systems
Neurofimctional modularity means that each particular function is subserved 
by a particular neural circuit which is independent of every other function. And 
even within other functions of language there is modularity in the sense that 
morphology, phonology, syntax and lexicon are quite separable, and they are 
separated by pathology. It is a notion of modularity in the sense of Fodofs 
(1983), which is also present in the view of Sharwood Smith (1991). Paradis 
looks at the mind as an organ, the way Fodor said, but where he differs 
somewhat from Fodor is that he assumes that all these various neurofunctionai 
modules do communicate with each other, in the normal use, these functions 
are used at the same time, but actually they are not integrated. They are all 
individual parts, but they all belong to an organism. The analogy is clarifying: if 
we look at an organism, we will see that our body has different parts, a liver, a 
heart; each one has a very specific role to play and is a very specific anatomical 
entity, but if we remove the kidneys, the heart does not work anymore; if we 
remove the heart, nothing else works. They are all interdependent, but 
nevertheless separable, each having its separate functions.
The neurofunctionai system that subserves language is very real, and in some 
cases, anatomically very different, so that we have a neuroanatomical module.
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But this is not always the case. There are modules that cannot be distinguished 
anatomically, but that can be distinguished neurofunctionally, because the 
difference may not be necessarily the locus in the brain, but the particular 
neurotransmitter which is at play. That is why it is better to say neurofunctional 
than neuroanatomical, although in many cases it is also neuroanatomical. For 
instance, language as a whole system is neuroanatomically separable from the 
rest of cognition. We have language located in several specific areas, which, 
when they work together, give rise to language. There is a very important area 
in the frontal lobe, namely Broca’s area. A. lesion anywhere in this area will cause 
aphasia, and a different kind of aphasia, depending on the precise location of the 
the lesion, which shows that even within language we have modules. We can 
have phonological problems (impairments) without syntactic problems, 
syntactic problems without phonological problems. This is known as double 
dissociation.
Double dissociation is the measure of modularity in neurofunctional terms. 
If we can show a double dissociation between any two functions or sub-parts 
of the functions, then we must assume there is some kind of neurofunctional 
independence of each of them. They are dissociated by pathology, but in the 
normal course of language use, are used together, integratedly. We cannot use 
our lexicon independently of our phonology or morphology. They are all used 
together at the same time with our pragmatic knowledge. So, it is not that they 
are independent to the point that they do not communicate with each other. In 
fact, they are often integrated into larger units, but separable, as determined by 
double dissociation.
The difference from Fodor is at this point. Fodor does not assume that the 
type of mechanism or circuitry which subserves each of these different 
functions is the same. Paradis also assumes that language is different from 
any other cognitive function, but this does not mean that the way that the
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neurons and the circuits of neurons which are at work are in any way 
different; it is just that they subserve different functions, but basically using the 
same type of mechanisms. It is an identical type of processing which leads to 
different results. For instance, memory is independent of language, but this 
does not mean that memory works in a different way from language. In the 
same way, any higher cognitive function (see glossary) is subserved by the 
same type of mechanism, and each one gives rise to a particular function. They 
differ ill the output, but the way they work is the same. Both language and other 
higher cognitive functions depend on the same kind of neural tissues that 
subserve them. Thus, we cannot expect them to behave differently. They 
behave in a very similar way, except that each subserves its own function. The 
fact that the system is modular does not mean that the inner working of each 
module has to be radically different from the inner working of another module. 
In sum, the very basic notion of modularity is the same, except that it is not 
applied to circuit mechanisms that subserve these functions.
M em ory systems involved in the acquisition of language
Memory is just an abstraction which does not exist by itself. It might be a 
metaphor or an abstraction built at the theoretical level, but at the 
neurolinguistic level it does not exist. There is no such tiling as general memory, 
nor as linguistic memory. Actually, if we want to represent memory, we have to 
assume it is not a unitary faculty, a monolithic function. Memory is a 
modular system: there are a number of different types of m em oiy (see Fig.l). 
There are two main types of memory, radically different from each other 
Short-term memory (STM or working memory) and long-term memoiy 
(LTM). Within LTM there are several different components, in particular, we 
have implicit and explicit memory. Implicit memory has eventually been, called 
procedural memory and explicit memory has been called declarative
memory.. Procedural memory can refer either to cognitive sklEs or motor 
skills. But there are some phenomena which are implicit, and which are not 
necessarily procedural, such as priming (see glossary). Declarative memory can 
be episodic (memory of events) or encyclopedic (memory of concepts).
MEMORY
Fig. 1 Types o f  memory, according to Paradis (1993)
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Within motor memory, there is sensory memory, that is, our memory for 
smells and sounds, etc., which can be selectively impaired. We have people 
with auditory agnosia who cannot recognize the sound of the bell, or of a horn, 
etc. Of course, this happens in the absence of primary sensory impairment. 
They hear it, but they cannot interpret what they hear. Still within motor 
memory, we have what Penfield (in Paradis 19S5) called praxic memory: 
knowing how to drive a car, ride a bike, all memory for skills that can be 
selectively impaired in the cases of apraxia. Tins is again evidence for a 
neurofunctional modularity system within memory. In sum, memory is a 
modular system, because there is double dissociation: it can be selectively 
impaired. There are the phonological, morphological, syntactic and lexical 
memories, different types of memories which may be impaired by the selective 
types of amnesia plus different types of aphasia. We may have two or more of 
these impairments at the same time, which is a syndrome; but the fact that we 
can have them in isolation speaks in favor of the existence of each of those 
particular subsystems.
Im plicit com petence
Implicit competence (or procedural competence) refers to something we infer 
(that is why it is called implicit). The behavior of the subject tells us that there 
must be some competence stored in that person's mind, but we have no direct 
access to that knowledge. So, we infer that there must be this kind of knowledge, 
otherwise the individual would not behave in Hie way that s/he does. This is 
what Chomsky calls implicit linguistic competence. We do not know in what 
form the rule is stored — all we know is that we behave very systematically and 
that tins behavior looks like it is rule-governed, so that we must assume ihal 
there is an implicit competence. We have to assume that the child is 
implementing rules, although it is obvious that s/he has no explicit knowledge of 
these rules. That is why it is counter-intuitive to talk about knowledge we are
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not aware of. Knowledge is what we know, so, how can we not know what we 
know? So, it is preferable to use competence instead of knowledge, it is what 
allows us to perform, even though it is opaque to introspection. Neurolinguists 
say that we have no way of finding out the form of this competence that we 
have in our mind.
Implicit competence refers to the fact that it subserves a skill. Language as a 
cognitive process is a skill like any other cognitive skill, and behaves 
accordingly. The competence that underlies that skill we call procedural, 
because it is a series of procedures, of which we are not aware, that subserve 
our performance.
Implicit competence is acquired incidentally , that is, it is acquired by not 
focusing on what is being acquired. We never acquire procedurally that upon 
which we focus our attention. It is something else which is being acquired. We 
focus our attention on something but it is another aspect of that particular item 
that is acquired. It is stored implicitly, i.e., we do not know its contents, the 
form of that knowledge, it is opaque to introspection. Nobody knows yet.
Implicit competence is highly inflexible and task-specific. This means that 
there is a different procedural competence for every function. Knowing how to 
ride a bike does not help to learn how to drive a car. Speech is a particular type 
of procedural competence which is independent of every other procedural 
competence and thus it is not influenced by other procedural competences.
Every implicit competence can be impaired. All we need is for Hie normal 
circuit that subserves this particular function to get inhibited, either by pathology 
or by disuse. This is true of language, in the case of aphasia, or this impairment 
can be caused by attrition: if we happen to be away from our country and do not 
speak our language for years, we forget it. That is why frequency of use is such 
an important characteristic of procedural memory, as well as recency of use. If 
procedural competence is not used, it becomes dysfiuent, ineffective, stiff or
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even extinct. In other words, frequency of use has an effect on performance. 
As we will see later, this is not true of declarative knowledge.
Implicit competence is used automatically, that is, we are not aware of its 
mechanisms of use: they are unconscious. We are not conscious of how we put 
our words together, we do not think consciously how we are going to say what 
we say. Morphology, phonology, syntax and retrieval of the lexicon are 
independent modules (we know that they are independent because they can be 
selectively impaired), which can and do work in parallel. In the course of 
speech they are integrated, they all have to be activated in parallel. The fact that it 
is automatic also means that we do not pay attention to what we are doing, 
therefore, it does not interfere with other automatic functions. Anything that is 
used automatically does not interfere with any other automatic system. We can 
perform several tasks which depend on different procedural competences at 
the same time, like talking while walking, because they are all procedural 
systems.
Explicit knowledge
Explicit knowledge (or declarative knowledge) refers to that knowledge which 
we consciously know and which we can talk about. There are two basic types 
of explicit knowledge, episodic memory, as called by Tulving (1972 cited in 
Paradis 1985), also called memories of episode: memories in which we 
participated, that is, what we did in the morning, the year before, wThat we saw, 
what we heard, all our previous experiences. That is why Penfield (1959 cited 
in Paradis 1985) has called it experiential memory. We can tell about it, so that 
it is declarative. The other type is conceptual memory, as Penfield called it, or 
what linguists very often refer to as encyclopedic memory: knowledge of Hie 
world. Everything that we have learned: Geography, History, things that are part 
of our conceptual system
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Explicit knowledge is acquired consciously, in opposition to procedural 
competence. We are aware of the information we are acquiring. It is stored 
explicitly in the sense that we have access to it. Any content of explicit memory 
can be recalled by conscious awareness, through introspection.
Explicit knowledge is very flexible. If procedural competence is task- 
specific, declarative knowledge, in opposition, is very flexible in the sense that 
it integrates input in all modalities. It does not matter through what kind of 
input we acquired the information, whether somebody told us, we read or saw 
it, or in what language it was heard, we store that as declarative memory and we 
can recall it. Every time we learn something new, it is integrated with previous 
information, in such a way that we have a lot of interaction between these 
memories. This integration of new explicit knowledge to previous knowledge 
is very well explained by Ausubel (1978), in his theory of meaningful learning.
The following chart summarizes the characteristics of both types of memory:
Procedural competence Declarative knowledge
#is acquired incidentally 
•is stored implicitly 
•is used automatically 
•is not verbalizable 
sis highly inflexible 
•is task-specific 
•frequency of use 
•recency of use
•is acquired consciously 
•is stored explicitly 
•its contents can be recalled to 
conscious awareness and 
verbalized 
•is flexible
•integrates input from all 
modalities
i'ig.'2 Characteristics of procedural competence and declarative knowledge,
based on Paradis (1993).
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Evidence fo r implicit acquisition
1 Children, in getting the meaning across, acquire the form. By focusing on 
the message, on die pragmatic aspect, the child ends up acquiring Hie grammar.
2 When learning anew sound, we focus on die acoustic properties of that 
new sound, but what gets stored in procedural memory is the proprioception of 
the sound, i.e., the feedback to the brain of how we should place every muscle to 
pronounce that sound, which allows us to produce it. The brain has an area, die 
synesthesic area, diat feels, in die sense diat it carries out a constant monitoring of 
where every muscle is at any given moment, when we speak or walk. This is the 
proprioceptor (see glossary). We focus on die result of die action, but diat is not 
what gets stored in procedural memory — that is episodic — what gets stored is 
die proprioception. The declarative, metalinguistic knowledge of how die sound 
is produced might help die person to practice, but what is going to be stored in 
procedural memory is not that knowledge, but the proprioceptive feedback, die 
feedback diat die brain gets from die place where any muscle is at any given time.
Anodier instance is learning to ride a bike. When we explain to someone 
how to ride a bike, the person internalizes certain rules of how to ride it. S/he 
might know everydiing about it, but it is only when the person gets 
proprioceptive feedback of every muscle involved diat s/he will be able to ride 
the bike.
Evidence fo r the dissociation betw een procedural and  declarative m em ory
What kind of evidence do we have for die distinction between declarative and 
procedural memory? The clearest evidence comes from amnesia (see glossary), 
from patient H.M., who has been studied for the past 40 years. It happened that 
he had one of his hippocampi removed in order to stop the spreading of 
epileptic seizures, but they did not know that the other hippocampus was also 
dysfunctional. As a result, they ended up with a totally anterograde amnesic 
patient, absolutely unable to acquire new memories. For the last forty years,
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that patient has not been able to acquire any new memory. He cannot learn a 
single new word, nor any new episodic memory (he cannot remember his 
address, for instance). Thai; shows the difference between lus declarative 
memory, which is completely deteriorated since the operation, and his 
procedural memory for skills -  he is able to learn new motor skills, like how to 
use his wheel chair or to play a new piece on the piano that he has never 
practiced before. His cognitive skills improve with practice in the same way that 
they do with normals. In all kinds of cognitive tasks, like recognizing a 
fragmented picture, in which first we see only dots, but eventually we recognize 
it, or the, Tower of Hanoi problem, he shows the same amount of improvement 
of normals, which shows that episodic memory has been affected, but not lus 
cognitive skills, nor his motor skills. He has no episodic memory of the actual 
event, but lias the benefit of the practice, which is probably unconscious, since he 
does not remember it.
Further evidence is from the patient (the nurse case, reported by Paradis 1993) 
who had tremendous word-finding difficulty. She could remember which 
object she was able to name the day before and which object she was not able to 
name, but that did not help her retrieve the name.on that day. This shows that 
the language system and the declarative memory system are completely 
doubly dissociated. It shows the other side of the dissociation, of the amnesic 
patient, who has lost his ability to acquire new explicit or declarative memories, 
but has retained the ability to acquire new procedural memories, any cognitive 
skill.
The evidence from amnesia tells us two tilings. On one hand, it tells us that 
implicit and explicit memory are subserved by neurofunctionally distinct 
systems, since when the hippocampal system is affected we lose our declarative 
memory, but we still have access to our implicit memory. On the other, it tells 
us that the lexicon is at least in part subserved by declarative memory, while
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morphosyntax is subserved by procedural memory. Since H.M. has never been 
able to acquire a new word, it seems that this ability is a function of declarative 
memory. That would be the case for the following reasons. We are at least 
conscious of the phonological form and of the meaning of the words we learn. 
For every word, we at least know its meaning and the way it is pronounced. But 
this is very different from morphosyntax, because we are not conscious of the 
morphosyntax we use, since nobody up to now knows what it looks like. A. 
three-year-old child is able to produce sound sentences, but s/he does not even 
know what verbs or nouns or adjectives are. Yet s/he produces them in the 
right sequence, with the right, agreement tense, etc. The child shows evidence of 
using an implicit morphosyntax of which s/he is not aware. There is a clear 
dissociation within language between that part of the lexicon which refers to 
phonological form and meaning and the part which refers to morphosyntax. We 
do not know consciously, unless we study grammar, whether a verb is transitive 
or intransitive. So, pronunciation and meaning of the word are known 
consciously whereas the rest of the lexicon is not. Some additional evidence of 
that dissociation has to do with the fact that the lexicon (meaning a number of 
words which have meaning and pronunciation) is also less sensitive to the age 
at which we acquire the word for the first time in the second language. This is 
shown by neuropsychological experiments called event-related potentials 
([ERP] Paradis, in print). We place electrodes on the scalp of the subject and 
we monitor the electrical activity over the various areas of the brain; we then 
notice that there is an area which is involved in the processing of words (i.e., 
lexical items), and a different area which is involved in the processing of 
morphosyntactic aspects, including function words. They are processed in a 
particular way as shown by these experiments. There is no difference in the 
processing of lexical items whether we learn a second language in age 2, 3, 10 or 
45, but there is a difference with respect to Hie way function words are
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acquired. There is anecdotal evidence that it is possible to acquire a very large 
vocabulary no matter when we start learning the language. People who have 
learned late tend to have problems with the phonology and with morphosyniax, 
but they acquire a large lexicon. A study in Britain (Conrad 1979 cited in 
Paradis [in print]) has shown, for instance, that deaf children who leam English 
late can acquire a very large lexicon, but remain impaired in the use of 
English grammar. There is this large body of evidence that comes from 
different directions, showing that lexical items behave differently from the rest 
of language, that is, from phonology and morphosyniax. This is also further 
evidence for critical periods. We are not talking about a critical period, but of a 
continuum which goes from age 2 to age 92 in which language gets more and 
more difficult to acquire as one gets older. There is no such thing as an absolute 
cut-off point, but if we acquire our second language later in life, we are going to 
show a different pattern of organization of our morphosyntax and of our 
function words. They will not behave in the same way as they do in umlinguals 
or in bilinguals who have learned their language early in life.
Besides clinical evidence, there is also neuroanatomical evidence for the 
dissociation and evidence from anesthesia. These are highly technical types of 
evidence which are not going to be developed here, but which can be found in 
Paradis (in print).
Maturational constraints on memory systems
All the evidence converges to show that the later the second language is 
acquired, the more different it is organized in the brain, as shown by function 
words. There is very strong psychological evidence for a difference between 
acquiring a first language and acquiring a second language later in life, at least 
with respect to morphosyniax, phonology and function words, but less true, 
however, for the acquisition of vocabulary.
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The capacity for acquiring procedures incidentally decreases with age. This 
is true not only for language, but for any procedure. The procedural aspect 
for speech is the same; the declarative aspect might be maintained full with age. 
In fact, when we look at procedural memory and declarative memory, it seems 
that procedural memory is much more fundamental, it is prior 
phylogenetically and ontogenetically, in the sense that animals show a lot of 
procedural memory and they have very little declarative memory, if any. 
Besides, children have procedural memory long before they acquire 
declarative memory. Tins is probably why we cannot remember anything before 
the age of 3 or 4.
Declarative memory seems to be a characteristic of the most advanced 
species. The declarative aspect of speech does not decrease with age. It improves 
with age, and so does the ability to store metalinguisticaliy.
Language aspects belonging to procedural and declarative memory
Concerning the lexicon, there are two aspects that should be considered. First, 
its acquisition; second, its use. With respect to its acquisition, part of the lexicon, 
namely, the phonological form of Hie words and their meaning, is declarative, 
we are aware of it, it is acquired consciously. The anatomical evidence we 
have is patient H.M. and other amnesic patients, who have difficulty in learning 
new words. As to function words, since they are a closed class, it seems that 
they are subserved by distinct neural systems, that is, they are acquired 
procedurally and thus are susceptible to maturational constraints (Neville 1992 
cited in Paradis [in print]). There is no difference in the organization of the 
lexicon (that part of the lexicon which is declarative) in first language learners 
and SL learners — there is no correlation between age of learning and the 
representation of the lexicon.
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An interesting aspect of the storage of words at the neurolinguistic level is 
that they are not stored as words, but as a matrix of features. Their meanings are 
multi-sensory engrams (see glossary), that is, memory traces of previous 
experiences that are perceived in a multi-sensorial way: they are connected to 
audition, vision, to taSte, to smell, to feeling. The engrams do not presuppose a 
biochemical, electrical or anatomical base, they are just memory traces left that 
form our mental representations or meanings.
With respect to the use of the lexicon, it is an aspect which is implicit, in the 
sense that we are not conscious of how we access the vocabulary and how it is 
integrated in the microgenesis of the sentence, when everything 'falls into place', 
the syntactic frame, the phonology, the morphology; in sum, the production 
realization is held outside awareness.
Phonemes are surely not declarative — children are not aware of them 
until they learn to read in alphabetical systems. There might be awareness of 
vowels, because they constitute the syllables.
Morphosyntax is acquired procedurally, like function words. It sorts out 
different areas of the brain active, according to whether we learn Hie second 
language later or early in life. Thus, it is subject to maturational constraints 
(Neville 1992 cited in Paradis [in print]).
Pragmatics is not stored with the language (following the Chomskyan 
division of grammar), it is stored separately, in the right hemisphere. Lesions 
in the language areas in the left hemisphere cause aphasia, whereas lesions in 
Hie language area in the right hemisphere do not cause aphasia, but cause 
pragmatic problems. The patient does not have morphological, phonological, 
lexical, or syntactic problems, but does have pragmatic problems, that is, 
problems with any type of inference from context, general knowledge, 
discourse, anything that is unsaid and must be inferred. Both hemispheres are
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absolutely essential for normal communication, but those who have the 
pragmatics impaired have a much more difficult social life.
In brief, if we have learned Hie second language early in life, there is no 
difference between the organization of the first and the second language. If we 
have learned the second language later, there is a difference -  probably it is 
stored deelaratively and used less automatically. There is evidence of 
differential organization of morphosyntax and function words in early and late 
SLA.
M etalinguistic knowledge
Is metalinguistic knowledge (MK) gradually automatized so as to become 
implicit? This is one of the key-questions of this study, and there is no doubt 
that Hie insights revealed by neurolinguistics are crucial to the study.
MK is different in kind, in contents, and is subserved by different neural 
circuits if compared to the knowledge we have been dealing with up to now, 
namely, knowledge resulting from linguistic competence.
What does it mean to be different in contents? MK is a kind of declarative 
memory, because it is knowledge we are conscious of (that is why we call it 
knowledge) whereas linguistic procedural competence is implicit and 
unconscious (that is why we call it competence , because it can only be inferred 
from behavior, it can never be inspected, introspected). The first kind of 
evidence that MK is declarative is that there is evidence of procedural 
competence without any MK, namely, a 4 or 5 year-old child who speaks the 
language and has absolutely no notion of grammar. S/He acquires the whole 
system, rather than learns it, without even being aware of the fact that s/he has a 
system in her/his mind.
The second kind of evidence pointed out by Paradis (1993) comes from the 
experience of anyone who has taught a second language or who has taught the 
native language as a second language. The first time a student asks, 'Why do you
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use the subjunctive here?’ we do not know the answer. We have been using the 
subjunctive for our whole life, but it would be surprising if we knew why. We 
quickly make up an explanation. Then we go home, open a grammar, and 
realize that it is only partly true. There are many more rules to explain it than we 
could suppose. We do not know that in an explicit way, in the sense of 
declarative knowledge, yet, we have this implicit linguistic competence. Tins 
is a case of having procedural competence without declarative knowledge. The 
reverse is also true and can be found in any SL classroom. People who learn a 
second language in school with a grammar-translation deductive method learn all 
kinds of rules, a given vocabulary, but are not able to produce sentences, to 
create them. What they have is MK, rather than an implicit linguistic 
competence.
MK is one source of knowledge that we have about both our first and second 
languages if we have been to school. The MK of our first language will be 
proportional to the degree of schooling that we have, which means that different 
people speaking the same language will have different levels of MK. This lias 
an important implication for the recovery of aphasic patients. Apliasic 
patients who have lost access to their procedural system have nevertheless access 
to their declarative system, which means that even though they cannot speak 
automatically anymore, they cannot use their competence anymore, they can 
still produce sentences in a controlled way, by consciously applying rules they 
have learned and stored as declarative knowledge. This is probably why it has 
been observed that the more educated the patient, the better the prognostic of 
recovery. This is not really recovery of procedural memory, but it is the ability to 
speak by using MK. Also, it might explain the paradoxical recovery of a second 
less well known language over the native language in some patients. They 
have lost access to their linguistic competence of both languages, but since they 
have learned the second language at school very formally and thus have a good
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amount of NIK, they can use that to perform in the second language. Obviously, 
they are slow and do it in a very reflective way, but that is usual in aphasic 
patients.
What does it mean to be different in kind? It means that the pedagogical rule 
we learned is not what we use when we speak using our linguistic competence. 
Our linguistic competence allows us to speak at a speed of up to 14 phonemes 
per second, integrating the search for lexical items, the phonological rules, the 
syntactic framework, etc., so that in milliseconds we manage to produce a sound 
sentence, not really knowing how we did it.
Another example comes from phonology, as mentioned before: when we 
learn anew sound, what we store in declarative memory is the description of the 
sound, the acoustic properties of the target sound, which is a different type of 
knowledge from that which allows us to produce the sound. What we store in 
the brain is the proprioception of the sound, the sense of where every muscle 
is at any second. That is stored as a kinesthetic program (see glossary), which 
can be used automatically to produce the sound. What is stored is kinesthetic, 
what is focused on is acoustic. They are different entities; one does not 
become the other, they differ in kind and in contents. In one case, it is a 
pedagogical rule, in the other case, it is whatever linguistic competence allows 
us to do.
In order for declarative knowledge to be used, we have to focus our 
attention on that piece of knowledge. This is very different from procedural 
memory — any kind of procedural competence can be used automatically, which 
means that we can use two or three automatic processes at the same time, but 
we can only concentrate our attention, our conscious awareness, on one thing at 
a time, because attention is selective. Either we concentrate on the 
pronunciation of the word, on the morphological form of it, or on the 
agreement of this word, but we cannot work out at the same time the syntactic
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frame, the morphological agreement, Hie selection of lexical items, and Hie 
phonological rule. It is impossible to integrate all of Hiat at the same time 
consciously; if we had to concentrate on each process at a time, then it would 
take much more time (much more time Hian conversational speed), we would 
have to create it in our head, and Hie processing would be serial, which is not 
Hie case, language processing works in parallel.
T he limbic system
Humans have a brain Hiat contains a huge amount of neocortex, which 
animals have in a much more limited quantity, and which are Hie most evolved 
structures. But they share with animals a less evolved structure, the brain 
stem, which is specialized for sensorimotor processes, reflex-like type of things, 
and a limbic system (LS), responsible for emotions, drives, motivations. 
Humans' emotions, motivations do have an impact on how Hiey process things 
at a higher cognitive level in their neocortex. Phylogeneticaliy and 
ontogenetically fliere is a communication system that exists long before language 
is acquired — most animals communicate through the limbic system and so does 
the child. When a child opens her/his mouth to say something, it is because s/he 
wants to get a meaning across, and Hiis drive to say something is a function of 
the limbic system. It continues to be present later on, so that every act of 
communication is based on some limbic participation. In 1977, Lamendella 
pointed out the various limbic areas Hiat are active at different times during 
the ontogenesis of the child. He also pointed out Hiat we have various functional 
subsystems, each providing its own contribution to Hie communicative function. 
They continue to contribute, once language is acquired. Lamendella stresses 
Hiat every limbic subsystem continues to exert control over these functions. 
Every utterance is limbically-based, Hiat is, has an intention to communicate as 
its basis. This intention focuses the attention of the individual on the message
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being communicated, rather than on its form, which is the best way to develop 
implicit linguistic competence. It is exactly this involvement of the limbic system, 
so important for the acquisition of linguistic competence, that has been missing in 
all of the teaching methods and approaches so far, with die exception perhaps of 
Hie communicative approach, which relies crucially on motivation.
Summary
We assume that language is a cognitive skill because it shares all the 
characteristics of cognitive skills: it is acquired incidentally, stored implicitly, 
used automatically, and so on. It is similar to other cognitive skills, like learning 
to recognize faces, directions, the dot problem, tower of Hanoi.
As to the organization of language, there are the LI and the L2, each with its 
subsystems, and the cognitive system. These systems are all subserved by 
different memory traces, and they all work along the same principles. They 
form a neurofunctional module which is subdivided into smaller parts. These 
parts are separable but related. They can communicate with each other. Even 
though we have functions that are quite different, that are subserved by 
different neuroanatomical or neurofunctional loci, they nevertheless are based 
on the same basic principles, because the brain works in fundamentally similar 
ways.
Implicit competence is called implicit because we infer its existence from the 
actual behavior of the subject. The characteristic of procedural competence is 
that its acquisition occurs by focusing on something different from what is 
stored. It is stored implicitly in the sense that we cannot have access to it; it is 
used automatically in the sense that we do not consciously control what we are 
doing.
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Explicit knowledge is acquired consciously, stored .explicitly, so that its 
contents can be recalled to conscious awareness and verbalized. It is flexible, 
that is, it integrates input from all modalities.
Explicit and implicit knowledge are dissociated. We realize that they are 
doubly dissociated when we look at aphasic patients who indeed have language 
problems but do not have explicit memory problems.
Conclusion
There are different levels of representation that are involved in the subject of 
language, and which are often misunderstood: die linguistic, the 
psycholinguistic, and the neurolinguistic levels. In fact, they are completely 
independent systems, that do not have any relation to each other. If we talk of 
language competence at the linguistic level, it has a completely different 
meaning than, if we talk about that at the psycho or neurolinguistic level. But, 
as mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, we can use a linguistic notion, 
such as the notion of competence, provided that we adapt that notion to the 
level at use, as Paradis does. But this must be very clear, very precisely done, 
otherwise, we will end up with a great miscellanea of concepts, and highly 
controversial, misleading theories.
One common misunderstanding regarding the levels has to do with the 
modularity of language. Because language is described separately at the 
linguistic level, this does not mean that it is separated at the neurological level. At 
the neurological level, we have functions/modules that work independently 
from each other, showing modularity among them, but neuroanatomically, we 
might find linguistic functions mixed in a same area. When at use, however, 
these functions are integrated, they form a whole named LANGUAGE.
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Chomsky's claim of implicit competence is at the linguistic level. It is just an 
attempt to describe the grammar that accounts for verbal behavior of native 
speakers. By no means is tins the form that is stored in the brain.
In the 70's, many psycholinguists tried to look for the so called psychological 
reality of these constructs. They never found them. But Chomsky never 
claimed that his constructs had psychological reality. We cannot blame 
Chomsky for the fact that others were not able to find neuro or 
psycholinguistic conformation of his constructs. He only postulated a refined 
description of how the system works — as a theoretical system. It is a purely 
theoretical system that intended to be complete enough to account for the actual 
production and circumstances of production.
What Paradis calls implicit linguistic competence is wliat we may infer (as 
Chomsky does) that we have at a neurolinguistic level. The form of this 
competence, precisely because it is implicit, is not known, and it is very 
unlikely to be any of the successive descriptions that Chomsky or any other 
linguist have created. It is of paramount importance to understand that Paradis is 
not claiming to know the internal organization of our neurolinguistic 
competence, but only its existence at a neurological level. Its organization, he 
says, we cannot know, otherwise it would not be implicit anymore.
Neurolinguists are strong in their criticism of the works of linguists like 
Chomsky and his colleagues, specially when we consider that they have tried to 
characterize linguistic competence for the past 25 years or more, every so 
often coming up with an entirely different way of describing it (the structuralist, 
functionalist, generativist, and within them, different ones). For the 
neurolinguist, this is evidence that we are not aware of what we have in our 
mind, that we do not know the form of the grammar that we have, if indeed 
we have a grammar in our mind.
129
But having in mind that neurolinguistics is a science in which empirical 
evidence is not taken to prove theory x, y or z right, but in which the data speak 
for themselves, at least two tilings can be assumed: 1 we do not know, by 
performance evidence, the form of this competence system; 2 we surely 
acquire and use it unconsciously. What we know is that the competence system 
allows us to behave in a systematic way. It might be described in terms of a 
generative grammar, or some other type of grammar, but it migjit also be a 
statistical system. It might be a system parallel distributed processing, where 
tilings get activated in the presence of stimuli. But the result is that we speak in 
correct sentences. It is like the proprioception, like the engrams, we have to 
assume they are there, but we do not know what they look like. That is how 
the brain processes language: we have absolutely no access to it.
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CHAPTER 11
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Similarly to memory, learning is an abstraction. There is no mental entity 
known as learning, at least not a single one. Learning is a collection of cognitive 
tasks or processes that lead to the modification of one's knowledge base or 
cognitive structure. These processes may take place consciously or 
unconsciously. Some instances of those tasks are linked to perception (attending 
or abstracting), encoding: storing in STM, storing in LTM, retrieving, or 
rehearsing. Hie most complex type of modification of the cognitive structure, 
namely, restructuring, can be found in the learning of language.
In fact, restructuring is not a common or easily observable process involved in 
learning. It has not been extensively studied yet, perhaps because the access we 
have to the organization of memory and creation of cognitive structure is 
limited to the observation of production. What adds to the research of this topic 
are studies on incidental or implicit learning, problem-solving, meaningful 
learning, discovery learning, in sum, types of learning processes that might lead 
to procedural competence in opposition to declarative knowledge. But the 
crucial question is. what makes one store things in procedural and NOT 
declarative memory and thus use different learning processes, different 
memory systems? McLaughlin (1986:122) approaches this issue when he asks:
Are there, for example, certain conditions that lead learners to be more (or
less) ready to restructure?
It seems that the answer lies in the notion of cognitive prerequisites, as 
Pienemann proposes, cognitive prerequisites specific to language, I would say. 
It is as if there were stages of language development, something akin to Piaget’s 
stages, but specific to language, not applying to general cognitive development
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Perhaps such stages are linked to Universal Grammar, perhaps something like 
UG exists at a psychological leveL not only at the linguistic level, because at the 
linguistic level we cannot or should not expect psychological realities, but 
metaphors, abstractions. In any case, what I mean is some kind of language 
constraints independent of the rest of cognition but nonetheless determined by 
it. This is possible, because language matures at its own pace, it does not 
follow other cognitive abilities, although it is related to them somehow. 
Language can either develop or be impaired separately from the rest of 
cognition, which speaks in favor of a specific language cognition, as shown by 
the case of Genie, the wild girl studied by Curtiss, and by all the selective 
impairments — amnesias and aphasias — reported by neurolinguistic research.
Another possibility that determines which type of memory shall be used and 
consequently which type of knowledge or competence shall be produced is 
certainly related to meaningfulness, to the involvement of the limbic system in 
the task being performed. Neurolinguistics calls limbically-based tasks those 
which have a deep involvement with the desire to communicate, to express 
something emotionally-rooted. Lamendella was the one who unfolded this and 
Paradis reminds us that there is no procedural competence if this deep 
involvement of the limbic system is not present. Concerning that, we must 
acknowledge Krashen's insights, which were so intuitively right. His notion of 
comprehensible input expresses precisely that notion, that the input must be 
relevant, meaningful, and comprehensible, adjusted to the level of the learner. It 
is comparable to Ausubel’s notion of meaningful learning, the type of learning 
that produces the highest level of retention possible.
Perhaps a realistic picture of how acquisition/learning takes place can be 
obtaining by joining both Pienemann and Seligef s view with Sharwood-Smith's 
(having in mind that this last one is a follower of Fodor). From this set of 
insights, it results that areas that have not undergone a critical period are those
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in which acquisition (procedural knowledge) can. still take place, i.e., a 
linguistic, language-specific module of cognition is used, and successfully. It 
produces 'acquired knowledge’. Now, areas of language which have undergone 
a critical period cannot benefit from the linguistic module, but only from the 
general module (following Sharwood-Smith’s frame), that is, the meta-mode.
In turn, encyclopedic learning takes place via practice, getting the most from 
formal instruction. The result is learned' knowledge, which is a type that has to 
be rehearsed in order to be stored. It is basically the same view held by Paradis’, 
with some differences in terminology, but following the same basic principles. 
The notion of modularity, very central to both views (Paradis' and Sharwood- 
Smith's) is somewhat different in each, but its core is Hie same.
The central difference between the linguistic view of Fodor and Chomsky and 
the neurolinguistic view is that grammars produced by linguists are ’real mental 
entities' to them, while to the neurolinguist they are but abstract hypothetical 
attempts to describe the way in which linguistic information is organized. 
Neurolinguists claim that we do not even know whether the linguistic 
information is organized in the form of rules, let alone in the form of grammar.' 
They say that it might very well be in the form of a network of connections  ^
strengthened and weakened by the environment, as has been proposed recently. 
Furthermore, the neurolinguist says that we will never be able to find out how 
our competence system is, because we can only infer from data produced by 
the speaker, which does not really give us a picture of it.
Psychologically-oriented theories, as I called them, provide us just with a brief 
account of unconscious processes. In fact, it is linguistic theories that rely on the 
workings of the unconscious, claiming the existence of entities such as UG, 
LAD, natural route, cognitive prerequisites. There is no doubt that these entities 
provide powerful explanations for the idiosyncrasies of the language learning 
process. However, they are hardly explained in depth by Hie linguist, letting
subjeciiveness and vagueness permeate Hie theories and consequently tlie 
field. Realistically speaking, the "black box' puzzle remains unsolved if we count 
on linguistic theories to explain it. As for theories that rely on Psychology, they 
all seem to equate Hie acquisition of linguistic knowledge to Hie acquisition of 
general knowledge, ignoring, Hius, Hie language specificity feature, which is 
so convincingly evidenced by Hie pathological data in neurolinguistic research. 
And by equalizing linguistic knowledge with general knowledge Hiey are 
suggesting Hiat all knowledge is declarative and Hius conscious, which is not 
Hie case. For that reason, psychological theories provide an even weaker 
account of unconscious processes, alHiough Hiey do explain how conscious 
processes occur. The state of Hie art being so, I call for a multi-disciplinary 
study of the unconscious, relying on Hie so called Cognitive Sciences. An issue 
Hiat deserves further study, in my view, is found in a sub-area of psychology, 
namely, perception. It is Hie study of pre-attentive processes, or processes Hiat 
take place before information is encoded in STM, which encompasses implicit 
storage of information, which does not require attention to be encoded. This 
might clear up linguistic questions such as why we abstract some linguistic 
structures at Hie expense of oHiers in the process of acquiring a language.
Pedagogical implications
It is not Hie objective of this-study to offer teaching procedures to be 
implemented in the classroom. While a theoretical study, its purpose is to 
provide theoretical background to the second language researcher and teacher. 
Teachers who lack such a Hieoretical background run the risk of following 
blindly trends and methods that are fashionable, but Hiat in fact are Hie dictates of 
others. Those teachers cannot say where Hie methods they use emerge from, 
what they aim at and what they shall produce in the learner. But irrespective of 
their awareness (or lack of it) of Hie Hieoretical backgrounds that permeate what
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they use in the classroom, such backgrounds do exist, and they do influence 
their teaching and their learners’ learning.
I believe that the bridge between the theorizing provided by this study and the 
teaching procedures should be built by the applied linguist. Neither the 
psychologist, nor the linguist or the neurolinguist are able to, or interested in the 
pedagogical implementation. They are interested in the issues of language and 
learning, as abstract, hidden entities to be unfolded. The applied linguist, on 
the other hand, is the classroom researcher and as such the mediator between the 
second language teacher and research. It is for the applied linguist, as well as for 
the conscious second language teacher, that this study is designed.
Suggested theoretical issues to be implemented by the applied linguist are 
Hie notions of contextualized practice and comprehensible input, for example. 
Concerning the first one, having in mind that procedural competence is built 
whenever the focus of attention is not on what is being learned, any activity 
that provides focus on meaning can be a useful procedure, be it in the form of 
task, or of communicative practice. The important thing is that practice must be 
contextualized, meaningful. As to comprehensible input, it must be specified 
what it should consist of in order to be relevant, arid the best way to adjust it to 
the level of the learner. For now, what we know is that comprehensible input is 
responsible for maintaining the learner's mind absorbed in something that is not 
the language being acquired, but that is given to the learner in the form of this 
language.
All in all, what can be concluded from this study is that we, second language 
researchers and teachers, do not have to wander about trends that are to tell us 
how a second language is best taught or whether we should teach metalinguistic 
knowledge to produce effective learning. We now know that there are distinct 
ways of building linguistic knowledge and metalinguistic knowledge and that 
the efficiency of teaching and of learning will depend on which type of 
knowledge we want our students to develop.
GLOSSARY
Acquisition - process of meaningful learning, in which structures or concepts 
are abstracted, picked up, grasped, extracted, or induced unconsciously through 
exposure to meaningful input, and stored procedurally.
Agnosia - inability to recognize things (concepts and objects) because of loss 
in sensory perception. (Rothenberg St Chapman 1989)
Amnesia - loss of episodic or semantic memory. Anterograde amnesia is the 
inability to acquire new memories. Retrograde amnesia is the loss of memories 
prior to the trauma (Paradis 1993)
Analysis - to segment the stream of acoustic signals into constituent units and to 
bring the latter into line with the parallel information on concurrent events which 
constitutes the situational context of the utterance. (Klein 1986)
Aphasia - the inability to use language because of a brain lesion. (Paradis 1993)
Apraxia - loss of volunteer movements. (Paradis 1993)
Auditorial Agnosia - inability to recognize sounds in the absence of primary 
hearing impairment. (Paradis 1993)
Broca’s area - area of the cerebral cortex involved in speech production. 
(Rothenberg & Chapman 1989)
Closed class - a group of words consisting of relatively few words, and new 
words are not usually added to them. Function words are a closed -class of 
words, which have little meaning on their own, but which show grammatical 
relationships in and between sentences. Conjunctions, prepositions, articles are 
function words.(Richards, Platt & Weber 1985)
Cognitive process - any mental process which learners make use of in language 
learning. (Richards, Platt & Weber 1985)
Conceito-chave em Lingüística Aplicada (Educacional) e em Psicologia 
Cognitiva Pode significar: (1) uma ação ou operação continua, específica, 
dirigida a um objetivo ou (2) uma série de etapas interdependentes por meio 
das quais atinge-se um objetivo. (Crystal 1980 cited in Gomes de Matos 1983)
Cognitive psychology - a branch of psychology that deals with the nature and 
learning of systems of knowledge, particularly those processes involved in 
thought, perception, comprehension, memory and learning. (Richards, Platt & 
Weber 1985)
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A discipline concerned with finding scientific means for studying the mental 
processes involved in the acquisition and application of knowledge. 
(McLaughlin 1990)
Ramo da Psicologia que estuda a cognição, i.e., a aquisição, organização e 
usos do conhecimento. (Neisser 1976 cited in Gomes de Matos 1983)
Cognitive system - a system of knowledge and belief that develops in early 
childhood and that interacts with many other factors (environment) to produce 
behavior. (Chomsky 1972)
Cognitive structure - the total content and organization of a given individual's 
knowledge. (Ausubel 1978)
Comprehension - the process by which a person understands the meaning of 
written or spoken language. ((Richards, Platt & Weber 1985)
Consciousness - a limited capacity mechanism involved in short-term memory, 
or what is remembered after internal processing. (Ericsson & Simon 1980 cited 
in Seliger 1983)
Consciousness-raising - Consciousness-raising, like knowledge about 
language (KAL) and language awareness, is drawing attention, during the 
process of language learning, to aspects of the nature and functions of language. 
Proponents of greater language awareness argue that more explicit and conscious 
attention to the systematic organization of language is a prerequisite for success in 
language learning. (Carter 1993)
Cortex - outer covering of the brain. (Rothenberg & Chapman 1989)
Creative construction - the process through which the child constructs a 
grammar of the native language based on the degenerate input s/he has access. 
It is possible due to UG principles. (Chomsky 1980). Dulay, Burt & Krashen 
(1982) applied it to SLA, being known as the 'creative constructionists' 
(Sharwood Smith 1986).
Deduction - Reasoning that begins with a specific set of assumptions and 
attempts to draw conclusions and derive theorems from them. (Reber 1985)
Dementia - progressive state of mental decline, esp. of memory function 
(anterograde and/or retrograde amnesia) and judgment. (Roflienberg & 
Chapman 1989)
Differential recoveries - when one language is recovered better than the other, 
after an impairment. (Paradis 1987)
Engram - padrão neuronal de um ato de habilidade adquirida por 
aprendizagem (sedimento mnêmico inconsciente ou latente de qualquer 
experiência). (Campbell 1986)
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Grammatical or linguistic competence - the cognitive stale that encompasses 
all those aspects of form and meaning and their relation, including underlying 
structures that enter into that relation. (Chomsky 1980)
Heuristics - processes of conscious or unconscious inquiry or discovery. 
(Richards, Platt & Weber 19S5) E.g., simplification, generalization, imitation, 
avoidance, Slobin's operating principles.
Higher cognitive functions - are those which are higher than just modality- 
specific. Language is one of these functions, language is not dependent on the 
primary7 auditory cortex. We still use language if we are deaf. (Paradis 1993)
Hypothesis-testing - relying on external feedback (positive or negative 
evidence) to check hypotheses.
Implicit learning - learning that is not overt., in the sense that is not open to 
introspection.
Learning of complex materials that is characterized by an eventual knowing of a 
rich abstract rule system that, itself is not the conscious focus of the learner. 
Implicit learning produces unconscious or tacit knowledge. (Reber 1985)
Incidental learning - in the case of language, learning that happens as a by­
product of trying to communicate.
Learning that takes place in the absence of intent to learn or instructions to that 
effect. (Reber 1985)
Induction - A process of reasoning in which general principles are inferred from 
specific cases. (Reber 1985)
Information-processing - a general term for the processes by which 
meanings are identified and understood in communication, the process by 
which information and meaning are stored , organized, and retrieved from 
memory, and the different kinds of decoding which take place during reading 
or listening. It includes the study of memory, decoding, hypothesis-testing 
and cognitive processes. (Richards, Plait & Weber 1985)
Kinesthesia - perception of body position and movement. (Rothenberg & 
Chapman 1989)
Modular cognitive systems - cognitive systems that are domain-specific (in the 
sense that the mind is structured into functionally distinguishable sub-systems), 
innately specified, hardwired (in the sense of being associated with specific, 
localized, and elaborately structured neural systems), autonomous (in the sense 
of not sharing horizontal resources [of memory, attention, or whatever] with 
other cognitive systems, and not assembled (in the sense of not having been put 
together from some stock of more elementary subprocesses). (Fodor 1983)
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Neurotransmitter - chemical thaï, affecte or modifies the transmission of an 
impulse across a synapse between a nerve and a muscle. (Rothenberg & 
Chapman 1989)
Ontogenesis - the development or course of development of an individual 
organism. (Webster 1980)
Ontogenesis of grammar - the development of communication in the child in real 
time. (Paradis 1993)
Performance - the actualization of competence.
Phflogenesis - the evolution of a genetically related group of organisms as 
distinguished from the development of the individual organism. (WTebster 1980)
Physiological - normal chemical and physical functioning of living 
organisms. (Rothenberg & Chapman 1989)
Plasticity - the ability of brain tissue to subsume functions normally carried out 
by other tissue. (Reber 1985)
Priming - the triggering of specific memories by a particular cue. (Reber 
1985) E.g. the word doctor primes us to recognize nurse as being a real word. 
(Paradis 1993)
Production - processo de planejamento e execução do ato lingüístico . (Crystal 
1980 cited in Gomes de Matos 1983)
Proprioceptor - sensory nerve ending located in muscles, tendons and other 
organs, that responds to internal stimuli regarding body position and movement 
(Rothenberg & Chapman 1989)
Selective recoveries - when one of the languages is not recovered and remains 
forever unavailable after an impairment. (Paradis 1987)
Slobin's operating principles - universais in the ontogenesis of grammar, as 
observed by Slobin (1973). They are: 'Pay attention to the ends of words1; 'Pay 
attention to the order of words and morphemes'; 'Avoid interruption and 
rearrangement, of linguistic units’; 'The use of grammatical markers should 
make semantic sense'; 'The phonological forms of words can be systematically 
modified'; ’Avoid exceptions'; and Underlying semantic relations should be 
marked overtly and clearly.
Subconscious - information that is not part of one’s momentary awareness bat 
which can, given the proper circumstances, be made conscious; information or 
stimuli that are at the margins of attention, events that one is only vaguely 
aware of It should not, in any circumstance, be used as a synonym for 
unconscious. (Reber 1985)
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Substrate - the layer or structure lying underneath. (Webster 1980)
Tacit knowledge - unconscious knowledge, which cannot be verbalized. (Reber 
1985)
Tower of Hanoi - a neuropsychological test to evaluate general cognitive 
abilities, in which the patient is given a board with three sticks; on the first stick 
we have a sortment of circles of different sizes and colors, forming a pyramid. 
The patient has to move them until s/he forms the same pyramid at the other 
end. (Paradis 1993)
Unconscious - Hie general notion is a level of mind lacking in awareness. 
Specifically, it refers to those internal processes (i.e. cognitive processes) that 
proceed in an implicit manner outside of consciousness [but not 
physiological processes]. Unconscious cognitive process is any process 
involving thinking, reasoning, judging, problem solving, etc. which takes 
place without consciousness, without awareness. (Reber 1985)
Universal Grammar - the system of invariant underlying principles of linguistic 
organization. (Chomsky 1972)
The language faculty of mind; [it is] concerned with the acquisition of highly 
abstract and complex principles and parameters of core grammar via the poverty- 
of-the-stimulus argument. (Cook 1993)
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